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ABSTRACT 
 
Effectiveness measures provide decision makers feedback on the impact of 
deliberate actions and affect critical issues such as allocation of scarce resources, as well 
as whether to maintain or change existing strategy.  Currently, however, there is no 
formal foundation for formulating effectiveness measures.  This research presents a new 
framework for effectiveness measurement from both a theoretical and practical view.  
First, accepted effects-based principles, as well as fundamental measurement concepts are 
combined into a general, domain independent, effectiveness measurement methodology.  
This is accomplished by defining effectiveness measurement as the difference, or 
conceptual distance from a given system state to some reference system state (e.g. desired 
end-state).  Then, by developing system attribute measures such that they yield a system 
state-space that can be characterized as a metric space, differences in system states 
relative to the reference state can be gauged over time, yielding a generalized, axiomatic 
definition of effectiveness measurement.  The effectiveness measurement framework is 
then extended to mitigate the influence of measurement error and uncertainty by 
employing Kalman filtering techniques.  Finally, the pragmatic nature of the approach is 
illustrated by measuring the effectiveness of a notional, security force response strategy 
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THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 
One accurate measurement is worth a thousand expert opinions. 
    – ADMIRAL GRACE HOPPER, 1906 – 1992 
 
Measurement is an integral part of modern life.  We measure our surroundings, 
ourselves, and the passage of time.  Measurement is needed to characterize the universe 
and everything in it (Potter, 2000:7).  Some have even suggested our advancement as a 
civilization is a direct consequence of our ability to measure (Sydenham, 2003:3).  
Despite its seemingly overwhelming importance, measurement is generally regarded with 
a ‘just look and see’ attitude; the complexities surrounding measurement often avoid 
critical analysis (Margenau, 1959:164).  This is largely due to the concept of 
measurement being closely aligned with the physical sciences where measurement is 
relatively more deterministic.  Other disciplines do not enjoy this level of objectivity.  
Fields in the social and behavioral sciences examine events, processes, and other complex 
phenomenon that are difficult to understand, let alone measure (Geisler, 2000:35).  
Another endeavor where measurement is difficult is military operations (Roche, 
1991:165).  Military operations are characterized by a dynamic and unpredictable 
environment (Clausewitz, 1976:119).  In this complex arena, one would like to measure 
the outcome of deliberate actions and specifically be able to measure them relative to a 
desired end-state.  One theory on how to achieve such desired end-states in military 
operations is called Effects-based Operations (EBO). 
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Effects-based Operations are activities designed to achieve specific outcomes 
versus activities focused on particular targets or tasks (Deptula, 2001a:53; Lazarus, 
2005:23).  EBO offers the potential to effectively and efficiently attain objectives across a 
wide spectrum of complex environments (Henningsen, 2003:3).  Based on its potential 
and supported by results since the 1991 Gulf War, joint doctrine and service doctrine, 
particularly Air Force doctrine, has undergone change to reflect the EBO concepts.  
Despite the tremendous promise of EBO, a key challenge is assessment or measuring the 
outcomes of military activities relative to the desired end-state (Glenn, 2002; Murray, 
2001; Bowman, 2002:24).  History has shown theory is of limited value if not supported 
by an empirically feasible measurement method (Scott, 1958:113; Zuse, 1998:84).  The 
challenge in military operations is the system of interest is often ill-defined, exhibiting 
dynamic, non-deterministic relationships. 
Although EBO is typically used in a military context, the problem of measuring 
the influence, or effectiveness, of actions in a complex, dynamical situation is certainly 
not unique to the military (Da Rocha, 2005:31).  Any situation where there is not a direct 
and intuitive way to measure progress towards a desired outcome (e.g. economics and 
law/policy making) relies on actions to shape the situation’s environment in order to 
bring about the desired end-state.  However, feedback is required to ensure the actions 
taken are moving the situation in a favorable direction.  This feedback is in the form of 
effectiveness measures.  Effectiveness measures provide the critical link between strategy 
and execution, essentially translating strategy into reality (Melnyk, 2004:209).  
Effectiveness measures amount to ‘cognitive shortcuts’ in the face of an overwhelming 
complex reality (Gartner, 1997:43).  Effectiveness measures influence how decision 
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makers assess the impact of deliberate actions and affect critical issues such as resource 
allocation as well as whether to maintain or change existing strategy (Gartner, 1997:1).  
Currently, however, there is no formal foundation or framework for formulating these 
effectiveness measurements.  Lack of a foundation and framework can lead to erroneous 
measures of effectiveness as exemplified in the following discussion between General 
George Patton and General Orlando Ward during WWII (Perret, 1991:156): 
“How many officers did you lose today?” asked Patton.  “We were 
fortunate,” Ward replied.  “We didn’t lose any officers.”  “Goddamit, 
Ward, that’s not fortunate!  That’s bad for the morale of the enlisted men.  
I want you to get more officers killed.”  A brief pause followed before 
Ward said, “You’re not serious, are you?”  “Yes, goddamit, I’m serious!  I 
want you to put some officers out as observers,” said Patton.  “Keep them 
well up front until a couple get killed.  It’s good for enlisted morale.” 
 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This research presents a new framework for effectiveness measurement from both 
a theoretical and practical view.  The research begins by examining the foundational 
aspects of measurement in a generic sense.  The examination includes a brief history of 
measurement to help establish a context for the many views of measurement as well as 
establish a basis for the presentation of Measurement Theory.  Attention then turns to 
application of measurement and the concepts surrounding measurement systems to 
establish a basis for the problems encountered in applied measurement.  Moving from 
measurement in general, to measurement of military effectiveness, an overview of 
military EBO is provided and compared to a formalized and disciplined framework for 
decision making, which is followed by a detailed look at ‘effects’.  A brief survey of 
concepts and military effectiveness modeling approaches is then provided.  Combining 
these general measurement concepts, as well as effect specific concepts, a general, 
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domain independent, effectiveness measurement methodology is established.  This is 
accomplished by defining effectiveness measurement as the difference, or conceptual 
distance from a given system state to some reference system state (e.g. desired end-state).  
Then, by developing system attribute measures such that they yield a system state-space 
that can be characterized as a metric space, differences in system states relative to the 
reference state can be gauged over time, yielding a generalized, axiomatic definition of 
effectiveness measurement. 
As noted, military operations, as well as other activities where measurement is 
critical, are conducted in environments that can be characterized as ill-defined and 
exhibiting dynamic, non-deterministic relationships.  Measurements in these 
environments can contain error yielding uncertainty concerning the true state of the 
system resulting from deliberate actions.  To address this problem with regard to 
effectiveness measurement, various probabilistic reasoning approaches are explored.  The 
effectiveness measurement framework is then extended to mitigate the influence of 
measurement error and uncertainty by employing Kalman filtering techniques. 
The effectiveness measurement methodology, along with the probabilistic 
reasoning technique, forms the basis for the research key result which is a Theory of 
Effectiveness Measurement establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for such 
activities.  Measurement itself, however, is an applied task.  Thus, to demonstrate the 
pragmatic nature of the proposed approach, the effectiveness measurement framework is 
illustrated by measuring the effectiveness of a notional, security force response strategy 




THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
PREVIOUS WORK 
The following sections of this chapter outline key measurement concepts as they 
relate to effectiveness measurement.  The initial three sections are intended to be generic 
in nature and applicable to any endeavor requiring measurement, covering fundamental 
notions about measurement, followed by a summary of the representational view of 
measurement and concepts relating to applied measurement.  The initial three sections 
will identify the general elements required for an effectiveness measurement framework.  
Then, moving from the general to the specific, an introduction to Effects-based 
Operations (EBO) and effects, as well as a brief survey of approaches for modeling 
effects, is provided.  These effects related sections will identify the specific elements to 
make a measurement framework unique for effectiveness measurement. 
MEASUREMENT FUNDAMENTALS 
Not everything that can be counted counts, 
and not everything that counts can be counted. 
      – EINSTEIN, 1879 – 1955 
 
Measurement is the objective representation of objects, processes, and 
phenomenon (Finkelstein, 1984:25).  Measurement captures information about these 
systems through their attributes (also known as characteristics, features, or properties).  
These attributes can be either directly or indirectly observable (Cropley, 1998:238).  
Additionally, a system embodies a set of elements where relationships exist between the 
elements (Feuchter, 2000:12; Artley, 2001b:3).  Thus, a system X is defined by the 
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attributes xi chosen to represent it: 
 X = 〈 x1, x2,…, xi 〉 ( 1 ) 
Although objective, an important distinction is that measurement is also an 
abstraction.  This challenging aspect of measurement makes it imperative to have 
formalized frameworks and theories for measurement in order to clarify concepts and 
ideas about measurement within a particular domain.  Measurement is an abstraction 
because measurement does not directly represent the system but only addresses the 
attributes selected to represent it (Pfanzagl, 1971:16).  In this light, measurement can be 
thought of as the process of assigning symbols to the attributes of a system such that the 
assigned symbols reflect the underlying nature of the attributes (Caws, 1959:5).  This 
nature is defined by relations evident when attribute measurements are compared 
(Pfanzagl, 1971:16). 
The assigned symbols can take on any form as long as the set of symbols reflect 
or can take on the same underlying structure as the attributes being measured (i.e. 
homomorphic).  Typically, the symbols assigned are numerals, where numerals are the 
material representation of the abstract concept of numbers (Campbell, 1957:295).  The 
assignment of numerals then allows the formal language of mathematics to be applied, 
enabling further insight into the system’s behavior (Torgerson, 1958:1) or more 
specifically the system’s change in behavior, which is central to effectiveness 
measurement. 
All measurement is carried out within a context (Morse, 2003:2).  This context is 
shaped by a purpose, existing knowledge, capabilities, and resources; all of which 
influence the measurement process (Brakel, 1984:50).  Within this context, measurement 
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begins by identifying the system of interest and the attributes to be used in defining the 
system as depicted in Figure 1.  Attribute selection is crucial since the validity of a 
system measurement is influenced by the number of attributes used in the measurement 
(Potter, 2000:16).  Although fewer attributes will simplify the measurement process, too 
few can result in poor and/or misleading insights about the system (Sink, 1985:68).  
Attributes are usually measured independent of one another (Pfanzagl, 1971:15) but 
hierarchies of attributes can be developed where the attribute or concept under 
assessment (Mari, 1996:128) can be a complex attribute made up of basic attributes that 














Figure 1.  Stages of Measurement 
Once the attributes are identified, observations or data collection, on the system 
attributes can take place.  Many terms are often used to describe the result of an 
observation such as measurement, indicator, or metric.  To clarify, a measurement is the 
raw symbol derived from the observation while an indicator, or index, is a measure for a 
complex attribute.  Further, the term metric has a precise mathematical definition: a 
distance between two entities where relations between them are non-negative, symmetric, 
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represents a system of measurement composed of the system attributes, the units of 
measurement, and unit reference standards (Geisler, 2000:75). 
Clearly, attributes affect the validity of a measure.  Validity characterizes how 
well a measure reflects the system attributes it was supposed to represent.  Another 
characteristic of a measure is reliability.  Reliability, or precision, addresses the 
consistency or repeatability of the measurement process.  A final characteristic of a 
measure is amplitude, which is how well a measure represents abstract or higher order 
constructs and complex attributes (Geisler, 2000:40). 












)(XfY =  
Figure 2.  Measurement Scale 
Measurements can be made through the human senses or made through use of a 
measurement instrument, which is an apparatus or construct used for measurement 
(Geisler, 2000:36).  Instruments can be simple like a ‘tape measure’ or complex, such as 
a mathematical model.  Regardless of form, the instrument must be based on a scale 
having the same underlying relationships as the system attribute being measured 
(Mitchell, 2003: 304).  A scale (Figure 2) is a predefined mapping from one domain to 
another, representing empirical system relationships (Sarle, 1995).  Because of this, 
measurement is closely tied to definition (Caws, 1959:3) and the family of mappings for 
attributes of a system can be considered a mathematical model of the system, since the 
embedding of the empirical relationships (Scott, 1958:116) requires an understanding of 
the empirical domain in order to map it into the target, or formal domain.  Further, the 
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mappings can encompass uncertainty through use of fuzzy scales to represent the degree 
to which an attribute is considered present (Benoit, 2003). 
Referring back to Figure 1, scales can be a source of error since a measure will 
always contain any error inherent in the construction of the scale (Potter, 2000:11).  In 
addition to scale construction error, each observation itself is a random variable with an 
underlying distribution (Potter, 2000:3).  A key issue in system measurement, depicted in 
Figure 1, is the possible sources for error in the process from selection of system 
attributes to system assessment insights.  This error creates divergences between the 
perceived state of a system and the true state.  These divergences can yield misleading 
insights about the effectiveness of deliberate actions on a system and thus, must be 
addressed in any framework for effectiveness measurement. 
There are three primary sources of measurement error: random, systemic, and 
observational.  Random error is non-deterministic variation from any source impacting 
the system including the system itself.  Systemic error derives from construction of the 
measure or definition of the measurement process and comes in the form of measurement 
bias.  Finally, observational error is the oversight of key system attributes requiring 
measurement or using the wrong measures for identified system attributes. 
Error in measurement is well established within the physical sciences (Campbell, 
1957:437) and will be part of the measurement process even when the system is well-
defined (Krantz, 1971:27).  Error is an inescapable feature of measurement (Mitchell, 
2003:301; Finkelstein, 2003:45) and is a key focus of Metrology, the science of 
measurement.  Measurement error can be partially addressed with Statistical Theory; 
however, it should be noted, the field of mathematical statistics concerns making 
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inferences from data, while Measurement Theory, discussed below, addresses the link 
between the data and the real-world.  From this point of view, one needs both to make 
inferences about empirical systems (Sarle, 1995:64). 
In many contexts, there is a ‘Catch-22’ with regard to system measurement.  In 
order to properly measure a system, one needs to know something about it; however, the 
very reason one may want to measure a system is to gain an understanding of it (Geisler, 
2000:35).  Often for complex objects, processes, and phenomenon with intricate networks 
of connections, the attributes that best define a system may be unknown, inaccessible, or 
only visible as an outcome.  Measurement of these systems requires use of a proxy or 
indirect measuring method (Potter, 2000:3) where a proxy measure is essentially a model 
or approximation of the system attribute of interest.  Quantification is the process of 
developing these indirect measures (Mitchell, 2003:302) or in other words, the process of 
converting empirical relationships into logical operations.  Although there is no universal 
approach for deriving these proxies, the process typically involves reducing complex 
aspects of a system into understandable, measurable components. 
By one definition, measurement is the assignment of numerals to a system 
according to a rule (Stevens, 1959:25).  However, not all assignment techniques are 
useful and some techniques have constraints on how the results can be assessed.  
Although there is not a standard of measurement for complex objects, processes, and 
phenomenon (Bulmer, 2001), a set of axioms for approaching measurement of these 






To measure is to know. 
     – LORD KELVIN, 1824 – 1907 
 
Formalisms regarding measurement are evident in Ancient Greek culture dating 
back to the 4th century B.C., but the initial foundations for an axiomatic approach to 
measurement did not emerge until the late 1800s (Finkelstein, 1984:25).  Much of this 
early work concerned the physical sciences, however.  It was not until the mid-1900s, as 
efforts to measure abstract concepts such as utility and aspects associated with 
psychology appeared, that a more robust set of principles regarding measurement evolved 
(Narens, 1986:169).  Interestingly, methods of measurement in classical, or Newtonian, 
physics have evolved without theoretical foundation while the ‘softer’ sciences required a 
more robust framework because of the abstract nature of the systems of interest 
(Finkelstein, 1984:29).  This robust framework is contained in Measurement Theory. 
Measurement Theory is 
a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to describe, categorize, and 
evaluate the quality of measurements, improve the usefulness, accuracy, 
and meaningfulness of measurements, and propose methods for 
developing new and better measurement instruments.  (Allen, 1979:2) 
 
Although there are several viewpoints regarding measurement (Cyranski, 1979:283; 
Schwager, 1991:618; Niederée, 1992: 237), the most widely accepted form is 
‘representational’ (Finkelstein, 1984:26).  The representational view is built upon three 
theorems: Representation, Uniqueness, and Meaningfulness (Luce, 1984:39).  For a 
system to be measurable, it must be possible to map a formal domain to an empirical 
domain.  The collection of axioms supporting such a representation is called a theory and 
generally consists of the necessary and sufficient conditions for measurement within a 
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particular domain (Schwager, 1991:619).  The purpose of a theory of measurement for a 
particular domain is to provide structure for a set of empirical observations describing the 
relations within a system (Finkelstein, 2003:41).  This structure can then be used to 
measure the system of interest for purposes of assessment (Scott, 1958:113).  The 
representational view asserts the symbols assigned to the system represent perceived 
relations between its attributes (Suppes, 1963:4).  Thus, the representational view is 
based on relational systems. 
A relational system is a set of elements where relationships exist among the 
elements (Pfanzagl, 1971:18).  A relational system can be mathematically stated as: 
 X = 〈 xi, R 〉 ( 2 ) 
where xi represents elements in X and R symbolizes the set of relations between those 
elements.  Real-world relational systems are referred to as empirical relational systems.  
As an example of another type of relational system, let Y = 〈 yi, A 〉 where yi ∈ R, R is the 
set of real numbers, and A represents the algebraic operations on R.  Y is known as a 
numerical relational system (Finkelstein, 1984:26).  Measurement, m, then can be 
formally defined as: 
 m: X → Y ( 3 ) 
where m is the one-to-one mapping of elements in X to elements in Y in a manner such 
that R ⇔ A (Roberts, 1979:52). 
This is a fundamental aspect of Measurement Theory and is known as the 
Representation Theorem and amounts to justifying the assignment of symbols in Y.  It is 
accomplished by proving portions of X and Y have the same structure (Suppes, 1963:4) 
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or that relations in the formal domain preserve the relations in the empirical domain 
(Finkelstein, 2003:43).  This theorem implies m is a structure preserving mapping 
between domains (i.e. homomorphism) (Apostol, 1974:84). 
Another component of Measurement Theory is uniqueness.  Uniqueness concerns 
the mathematical characterization of the family of allowable transformations.  The 
Uniqueness Theorem requires any transformations of the mappings m ∈ M from X → Y 
to maintain the representation conditions (Suppes, 1963:19).  In other words, only 
admissible transformations are allowed (Finkelstein, 2003:43).  A great source of 
difficulty in developing a theory of measurement is not only discovering relations which 
have an exact and reasonable numerical interpretation, as well as a practical empirical 
interpretation, but proving under which conditions the relations hold (Scott, 1958:113).  
However, if these conditions do hold, a scale of measurement S can be defined as: 
 S = 〈 X, Y, M 〉 ( 4 ) 
Table 1.  Scale Types (Narens, 1986:168) 
 
 
Scale Admissible Transformations Examples 
Absolute x → x “John is twice as tall as Bill” 
Discrete 
Ratio x → k
n, constant k > 0, n ∈ Z length in lines of code 
Ratio x → rx, r ∈ R+ age, speed, Kelvin temperature 
Discrete 
Interval 
x → knx + s, constant k > 0, 
n ∈ Z, s ∈ R 






, constant k > 0, 
n ∈ Z, s ∈ R 
murder rate per 100,000 
police force per 100,000 
Interval x → rx + s, r ∈ R+, s ∈ R temperature (Fahrenheit or Celsius), calendar dates 
Log Interval x → sxr, r, s ∈ R+ density (mass/volume), fuel efficiency in mpg 
Ordinal x → f(x), f monotonic beauty, hardness 





Figure 3.  Scale Hierarchy of Commonly Used Measures (Ford, 1993:9) 
Despite the generalized notation, only a few scale types exist (Stevens, 1946:677).  
These are listed in Table 1.  These types are sometimes referred to as levels of 
measurement since each distinguishes the number and types of information contained 
within the relations of the formal domain.  The most common scale types are the 
Nominal, Ordinal, Interval, Ratio, and Absolute scales (Sarle, 1995:63).  A nominal scale 
only contains equivalence meaning.  The ordinal type has both equivalence and rank 
order meaning.  Interval measures have these two meanings as well but also have 
meaning in the intervals between the values.  Ratio measurement further adds meaning in 
the ratios of values.  Finally, absolute scales measure ratios with no units attached, but are 
also often interpreted as measurement by counting.  These scale types are hierarchically 
related, with the absolute scale type being at the top as shown in Figure 3.  Thus, a higher 
level scale type can always be converted to a lower level scale but not vice versa (Ford, 
1993:9).  As noted, scale type provides an indication of how much information the 
assigned symbol contains about the system attribute (Torgerson, 1958:21) but also 




A final tenet of Measurement Theory concerns meaningfulness.  A measure is 
meaningful, if and only if, the resultant is invariant for admissible transformations 
meeting the uniqueness condition (Suppes, 1963:66).  Meaningfulness is specific to scale 
type and can yield misleading or erroneous results when truth or falsity depends on the 
scale type used (Burke, 2003; Roberts, 1984). 
As can be seen, the Representation, Uniqueness, and Meaningfulness Theorems 
have a hierarchical relationship.  The construct starts with proof of the formal 
representation of the system.  Then, uniqueness addresses the class of transformations 
that maintain the representation.  Stated differently, a representation theorem shows how 
to embed a qualitative structure homomorphically into some family of numerical 
structures and the corresponding uniqueness theorem describes the different ways that the 
embedding is possible.  Finally, meaningfulness deals with the invariance of a specific 
symbolic (numerical) statement across admissible transformations. 
Many attributes can be measured directly.  These are termed extensive attributes, 
or fundamental measures (Narens, 1985:78).  Other measurements may be based on 
assumed relations or by arbitrary definition (Torgerson, 1958:22).  However, as already 
noted, not all attributes are easily measured.  For these intensive attributes (Suppes, 
1963:15), indirect measures may not be empirically significant.  These proxies are also 
referred to as weakly defined measures.  Systems with such attributes are characterized 
by ill-defined representation, uncertainty about relational aspects within the system, and 
have little theory supporting the underlying nature of the system.  For attributes of these 
systems, measurement often precedes definition working in an exploratory, recursive 
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process where measurement leads to definition and definition leads to refined measures 
(Finkelstein, 2003:45). 
One approach to addressing measurement of these ill-defined systems is through 
conjoint measurement (Luce, 1964:1).  Conjoint measurement, or multidimensional 
scaling (Torgerson, 1958:248), assumes additive or multiplicative decomposability of 
qualitative structures and combines several indirect or derived measures to increase 
empirical significance (Narens, 1985:182), where a derived measure is a measure based 
on other measures (Pfanzagl, 1971:31).  Decomposability implies multi-attribute 
mapping functions, with corresponding scales which preserve empirical ordering, exist 
(Krantz, 1971:317).  Conjoint measurement is common in developing utility functions 
and development follows a similar procedure (Keeney, 1993:91).  Further, the 
mathematics for working with these constructs is well established (Narens, 1976:197).  
Although conjoint measurement was initially developed to address weakly ordered 
attributes, the framework results in a structure for the simultaneous measurement of all 
attributes (Finkelstein, 1984:28).  It should be noted, these structures are sometimes 
referred to as product structures, where dependent system variables are explained by a 
number of system stimuli (Roberts, 1979:198). 
As already suggested, all measurement is carried out within a context.  This 
implies some purpose for conducting measurement.  This purpose can be for system 
description, monitoring, and/or forecasting.  With the theoretical foundations for 





APPLICATION OF MEASUREMENT 
Count what is countable, measure what is measurable, 
and what is not measurable, make measurable...  
       – GALILEO, 1564 – 1642 
 
As noted, measurement is a routine, everyday process and a necessity in most 
fields of endeavor (Rumsey, 1990:19).  Measurement is fundamental to understanding, 
controlling, and forecasting (Wilbur, 1995:1; Antony, 1998:7).  Whether conducted 
explicitly or implicitly, measurement is the mechanism for extracting information from 
empirical observation.  However, obtaining this insight is dependent on having feasible 
implementation methods, as well as reliable models, for approaching the task of 
measurement (Sink, 1991:25). 
Measurement is applied to a system within a specific context (Morse, 2003:2).  
The measurement context defines the need for conducting system measurement.  This can 
be for exploratory purposes such as characterizing a new system, but commonly involves 
resource commitment decisions.  Regardless of context, a key aspect for measurement of 
a system is its environment.  Within its environment, a system has some purpose or 
normative behavior.  The behavior of most real world systems is the result of a complex 
set of interactions and real world systems typically have a complex, abstract purpose.  
Measurement translates this complex behavior or abstract purpose into a set of ‘vital 
signs’ indicating variations in system behavior or gauging fulfillment of system purpose 
(Kaplan, 1996:75; Melnyk, 2004:209; Ittner, 1998:205) and, most importantly, measures 
indicate when a system has fulfilled its purpose or is acting in accordance with its 
normative behavior (Sproles, 1997:16).  Further, depending on the measures used, 
measurement can yield information on when and why a system is deviating from its 
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normal or desired behavior (Kaplan, 1996:84).  In order to achieve maximum benefit, 
however, measurement must be an explicit and objective activity.  This is accomplished 
through measurement planning (Antony, 1998:14).  If proper planning is not conducted, 
measurement can become unreliable, untimely, and be more of a burden than a benefit 
(Antony, 1998:17; USAF, 2003:40). 
Measurement activities are often executed as an afterthought and evolve without 
oversight (Melnyk, 2004:210) leading to ineffectual measures and wasted resources 
(Hamner, 1993:1-4).  One way to prevent this is by developing a measurement plan 
(Sink, 1985:77).  A measurement plan addresses the information to be derived from the 
measurement activity (Park, 1996:1) and how the system will be measured to include 
how measures will be determined and how measurements will be collected, as well as the 
allocation of resources for measurement activities to include training and tools (Eccles, 
1991:133).  The plan contains all information required to conduct system measurement 
within a specific context (Neely, 1997:1138) and is sometimes referred to as the 
measurement protocol (Kitchenham, 1995:937).  Additionally, the measurement plan 
may be integrated with other plans concerning the system such as a strategic plan.  
Further, the measurement plan should be a ‘living document’ implying it not only serves 
to guide the measurement process, but should be used to document, or be an ‘audit trail’, 
for how the system measurement process was executed (Sproles, 1996:37). 
Before measurement planning can begin, however, a framework for 
conceptualizing measures is needed.  Measure frameworks ensure measurements are 
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Inputs – any controllable or uncontrollable factor that enters the system 
Outputs – system transformation of the inputs 
Effect – changes resulting from the outputs 
Outcome – the conditions created by system effects 
Purpose/Impact – reason for system existence or expected system behavior 
 
Measure of Outcome (MOO) – gauges conditions created by system effects Strategic – directly concerns the system purpose or normative impact 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) – measure changes resulting from outputs Operational – intermediate events required to achieve the system purpose 




Differentiating between the different frameworks is crucial for effectiveness 
measurement.  These frameworks are commonly classified as either vertical or 
horizontal.  The vertical, or hierarchical, structure is associated with measures that can be 
directly linked to the system purpose or normative behavior.  The horizontal structure, or 
process framework (De Toni, 2001:50), on the other hand, is normally aligned with 
system processes, where a process is a set of actions or functions yielding some result 
(Artley, 2001a:15).  Additionally, the vertical structure is often linked with fundamental 
system objectives, where a fundamental objective is the overall desired or expected 
system end-state.  Alternatively, the horizontal structure is usually linked with means 
objectives, where a means objective is an enabler for a fundamental objective (Keeney, 
1992:66).  Typically, measures in the vertical construct are associated with system 
effectiveness and measures in the horizontal construct concern system efficiency.  
However, these structures are not exclusive of each other.  They can exist at the same 
time for a system and further, a single measure can exist simultaneously in both 
constructs (Keeney, 1992:89). 
Measures of effectiveness and measures of efficiency provide different insights 
about a system.  A measure of effectiveness (MOE) concerns how well a system tracks 
against its purpose or normative behavior (Sproles, 1997:17).  However, a measure of 
efficiency, which is also known as a measure of performance (MOP), describes how well 
a system utilizes resources (Sink, 1985:42).  In other words, a MOE determines if the 
right things are being done and a MOP determines if things are being done right (Sproles, 
1997:31).  This subtlety is crucial since these measures are developed from differing 
viewpoints.  A MOE can be considered invariant to means of achievement (Lebas, 
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2002:73; Sproles, 2000:54) while a MOP characterizes system capability or the attributes 
of a system under a specified set of conditions and is thus, system dependent (Sproles, 
1997:16; Sproles, 2000:57).  The key distinction, however, is a MOP alone does not 
provide indication of progress towards a system’s purpose or indication of normative 
behavior.  Beyond measures of effectiveness, measures of outcome (MOO) gauge 
indirect conditions created by system effects (DSMC, 1994), as depicted in Figure 4. 
For example, suppose a transshipment warehouse desires a low wait time for 
items awaiting transit.  If we let the desired effect be measured by amount of wait time, 
one choice for a MOE is average item wait time.  As alternatives for transit, trucks, trains, 
and planes can be used.  Regardless of which alternative is used, the MOE will not 
change.  However, each mode of transit will have a different performance measure or 
MOP (e.g.  truck loads, box cars, and plane loads).  Additionally, in this hypothetical 
scenario, because of lower wait times, items are getting to customers faster, resulting in 






Figure 5.  Input-Output Model (Sink, 1985:3) 
Another useful construct for conceptualizing a system is an input-output model 
(Figure 5).  Inputs can be any controllable or uncontrollable factor.  These inputs enter 
the system and are ‘transformed’ into outputs.  The outputs result in various effects 
contributing to conditions in the system’s environment which leads to attainment of the 
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system’s purpose or normative behavior.  The input-output concept is invariant regardless 
of perspective, with the only change being the type and size of the system and its 
associated transformations.  The key task in development of the model is operationalizing 
the relationship between the input and output (Sink, 1985:4) where ‘operationalize’ is the 
act of quantification or defining an attribute by the way it is measured.  The input-output 
model provides a means for system feedback or quantifying the impact of an input, which 
is fundamental to understanding and control of any system (Kaydos, 1999:1; Neely, 
1997:1132). 
A critical element of the input-output construct is defining system boundaries.  
The boundaries of a system are where elements of the system interact with elements 
outside the system.  Everything outside this boundary is considered the system’s 
environment.  The system environment can be described as those factors external to the 
system that will influence the system over the period of measurement (Artley, 2001a:9).  
Identifying the boundaries is crucial since they influence the scope of measurement 
(Sink, 1985:27).  Further, making accurate inferences from measurements requires an 
understanding of the circumstances surrounding the system when the measurements were 
taken (Wilbur, 1995:17).  This contextual information provides insight into why a system 













A conceptually helpful extension of this construct is visualizing a network of 
linked input-output systems, where outputs of one system are the inputs of others (Figure 
6).  In fact, every system can be seen as part of another larger system (Ackoff, 1971:663).  
Thus, the combining of systems yields a larger system with its own inputs, outputs, 
effects, outcomes, purpose/behavior, and boundaries.  However, within this larger 
system, each sub-system still has its own input, output, effect, outcome, 
purpose/behavior, and boundary (Sproles, 1996:34). 
This system-of-systems view allows for conceptualizing the overall system at 
different levels to include strategic, operational, and tactical (Figure 4).  The strategic 
level directly concerns the system purpose or normative behavior.  The operational level 
focuses on intermediate events required to achieve the system purpose or normative 
behavior.  Finally, the tactical level addresses short-term activities necessary to attain 
operational level outcomes (Artley, 2001b:12).  An interesting analogy for this system-
of-systems construct that could also be used to identify significant sub-system inter-
linkages is a neural network.  Neural networks are made up of perceptrons, which are 
simple input-output systems.  Collections of these perceptrons, as a neural network, can 
be used to model and explain highly non-linear systems (Mitchell, 1997:81).  However, 
even with simple linear systems, there are numerous challenges confounding the 
measurement process. 
The key to successful measurement is ensuring the right measures are being used 
to gauge the system purpose or normative behavior (Brown, 1996:3; Leonard, 2004:2).  
The goal is to understand which inputs or environmental conditions lead to which 
outcomes (Morse, 2003:38).  The key challenge, however, is what we would like to 
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measure and what we can measure are usually not the same thing (Meyer, 2002:17).  
Additionally, most endeavors are very situation dependent, ruling out ‘one size fits all’ 
sets of measures (Antony, 1998:9; Balkcom, 1997:28; Roche, 1991:191).  It is generally 
accepted, however, the vertical framework should be used for effectiveness measures 
where all measures are derivative of the system strategic purpose or normative behavior 
(Brown, 1996:162).  Thus, even operational and tactical level measures should flow from 
the strategic level (Campi, 1993:8-4.3). 
The crux of the problem in understanding which inputs lead to which outcomes is 
identifying and articulating the cause-effect linkages between the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels as well as the impact of inputs and environmental factors on each of 
these levels (Kaplan, 1996:76; Sink, 1985:86).  The difficulty in establishing these 
linkages is usually understated (Hamner, 1993:2-7).  The cause-effect relationship can be 
difficult to discern because the output of one system may be the input of another system 
and some of the systems may be hidden or inaccessible (Leonard, 2004:35).  
Additionally, there may be a dynamic delay between a system input and when the impact 
of that input is seen.  Further, for systems in dynamic environments, the cause-effect 
relationships can change over time (Kaplan, 1996:84) or the system may even adapt to 
being measured (Neely, 1997:1132; Meyer, 2002:79). 
Basic approaches, such as cause-effect mapping, can assist in identifying and 
explaining some of the linkages.  However, the use of historical measurements and 
statistical techniques are normally required to understand more complex systems 
(Kaydos, 1999:115; Evans, 2004:219).  If these linkages can be identified and 
understood, a model representing the logical framework of interdependencies between 
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elements within a system and between the system and its environment can be developed.  
A model based on this representation can then be used for purposes of system forecasting 
(Feuchter, 2000:12; Kircher, 1959:66). 
Despite the challenges of uncovering system relationships, applied measurement 
concerns the outward behavior of systems versus their internal dynamics.  Thus, an 
effectiveness measurement framework should consists of system measures explaining 
this behavior.  The primary goal in developing system measures is to create a set of 
measures yielding the most insight while imposing the least amount of burden (Antony, 
1998:8). 
Approaches to developing measures vary; however, there appears to be wide 
agreement the starting point is defining the system’s strategic purpose or normative 
behavior as well as associated fulfillment criteria (Sink, 1985:86; Hamner, 1993:2-9; 
Brown, 1996:11; Antony, 1998:9).  These strategic level definitions can be abstract and 
difficult to quantify for real world systems.  Thus, subsequent steps involve reducing the 
strategic level concepts into conditions or outcomes supporting the system purpose or 
normative behavior (Hamner, 1993:2-9).  An extension of this step sometimes employed 
is determining the relative importance, or weighting, of multiple, and possibly 
conflicting, conditions or outcomes (Hamner, 1993:2-12).  These can then be further 
reduced to effects that would bring about the outcomes or conditions (Brown, 1996:11).  
Next, system outputs that would achieve the effects can be identified.  Finally, inputs 
required to create the outputs are defined (Sink, 1985:86) as shown in Figure 4.  The 
basic concept is to work backward through the cause-effect relationships, iteratively 
decomposing abstract concepts to a point where they are so narrowly defined a measure 
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suggests itself (Sink, 1985:86).  Hopefully, this approach yields a direct, natural measure, 
or a measure with a universal interpretation that directly measures system purpose or 
normative behavior.  If it does not, a constructed measure must be used. 
A constructed measure is defined for a specific context and has two forms.  The 
first is a subjective or categorically defined scale.  The second form is an aggregation of 
several natural measures to form an index.  However, if no natural measures are readily 
apparent and a constructed measure can not be derived, a proxy or indirect measure 
reflecting attainment of an objective associated with the strategic objective can be used 
(Keeney, 1992:101). 
Table 2.  Measure Types (Kirkwood, 1997:24) 
 
The relationships between these measure types are summarized in Table 2.  
Regardless of the type of measure, the above reductionist process assumes linear 
decomposition, implying the sum of the constituent parts is representative of the overall 
system behavior, however, it does not propose how quantification of a complex system 
can be made tractable (Beckerman, 2000:97).  The reductionist philosophy is based on 
the premise that elements of one kind are combinations of elements of a simpler kind 
(Sproles, 1996:34) and is central to developing an effectiveness measurement framework. 
 Natural Constructed 
Direct 
- Commonly understood measures directly 
linked to strategic objective 
- Example: Profit 
- Measures directly linked to the strategic 
objective but developed for a specific 
purpose 
- Example: Gymnastics scoring 
Proxy 
- In general use measures focused on an 
objective correlated with the strategic 
objective 
- Example: GNP (economic well being) 
- Measures developed for a specific 
purpose focused on an objective 
correlated to the strategic objective 
- Example: Student grades (intelligence) 
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However, this decomposition process may not be applicable to all systems.  Some 
systems may be better suited to a Systems Thinking, or holistic approach, where the focus 
is on the interactions between the elements in a system versus the elements themselves, 
implying the sum of the parts is greater than the whole (Beckerman, 2000:98).  Instead of 
breaking the system into smaller and smaller parts, as in reductionism, the Systems 
Thinking approach takes an expansionist view by incorporating more and more of the 
system element interactions.  In other words, Systems Thinking moves a system 
boundary incrementally further out to incorporate more interactions.  However, this can 
result in more complex system models.  One methodology to leverage the strengths of 
both of these views is to start with the reductionist approach and then build back up with 
the Systems Thinking approach (Beckerman, 2000:99). 
Regardless of the modeling approach, large, complex systems can result in 
numerous measures, each providing only a narrow view of the system.  Having numerous 
narrow views can make it difficult to assess the overall system status.  Although the 
lower level measurements provide the most unambiguous insight about system attributes 
(Jordan, 2001:17), to get strategic, system level insights, measurements must be 
combined to summarize this lower level data (Antony, 1998:13; Brown, 1996:4).  The 
problem, however, is the measurements are usually not in the same units.  Aggregation 
involves normalization, standardization, or other means to make these dissimilar 
measurements commensurable so they can be mathematically combined.  Combining 
dissimilar measurements to get an overall system measurement, however, requires an 
understanding of the scale types being used in order to ensure the aggregated 
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measurement is meaningful and preserves the original scale level information (Antony, 
1998:13). 
The normalization process only yields dimensionless measures.  Thus, a means of 
aggregation is needed.  There are a number of ways to achieve this.  The most obvious is: 
 M = ∑ wimi ( 5 ) 
where aggregated measure M is derived by summation of i measures (m) each multiplied 
by a predetermined weighting (w) or influence on the aggregated measure.  If the 
relationship between the measures is known to be non-linear, a multiplicative aggregated 
measure can be used: 
 M = ∏ wimi ( 6 ) 
Finally, for well understood systems, a high order polynomial may yield an aggregated 
measure more closely capturing the system’s underlying nature (Pinker, 1995:10): 
M=∑wimi+∑wimi2+…+∑wimin+∑wijmimj+∑wijkmimjmk+…+∑wij…nmimj…mn ( 7 ) 
Despite unique measures being required for most systems, and even for the same 
system in different environments, good measures share some common characteristics.  
These properties can be categorized as strategically-linked, timely, objective, economical, 
complete, and measurable. 
• Strategically-linked – Effectiveness measures should be traceable to the 
system strategic purpose or behavior (Kaplan, 1991:73).  Additionally, 
strategically-linked implies the measure is responsive to change and provides 
an indication of how much change can be attributed to a system input (Neely, 
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1997:1137).  However, other measures, such as process measures, are 
important for determining why a system is behaving the way it is (Brown, 
1996:44; Meyer, 1994:97). 
• Timely – Measures should be collected and processed in a timeframe that is 
needed to be relevant within the context (Kaplan, 1991:73; Harbour, 1997:8).  
This property is at the heart of the trade-off between timeliness and 
measurement accuracy. 
• Objective – This category has two dimensions. 1) Collection: Measures 
should be easy to understand, be the same regardless of the assessor 
(accuracy), and be the same under similar circumstances (repeatability) 
(Finkelstein, 2003:41).  Objectivity also implies credibility which concerns 
measure ‘face-value’ or whether the measure logically represents what it is 
supposed to represent.  It should be noted, an objective measure can be 
qualitative but subjective measures should be avoided (Kaydos, 1999:19) 
since these types of measures are difficult to verify.  Subjective measures are 
commonly associated with questionnaires and interviews (Wilbur, 1995:20).  
2) Interpretation: Measures, once obtained, should have an unambiguous 
interpretation (Antony, 1998:9) and more importantly, distinguish between 
desired and undesired consequences (Meyer, 2002:79). 
• Economical – Collection and processing of measurement data should provide 
benefits that off-set the burden of measurement activities (Kaplan, 1991:73).  
Part of an economical measurement system is ensuring the measures are 
unique and do not contain redundant information (Artley, 2001b:39). 
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• Complete – Measures should address all areas of concern in enough detail to 
discern reasons for differences in actual and expected system results (Kaydos, 
1999:48).  Completeness does not require identifying every relevant system 
attribute, however; a spanning set of measures associated with the system’s 
purpose or behavior should be attained.  Additionally, measures should be 
limited to those vital for assessing system strategic purpose/behavior and 
reasons for deviations (Hamner, 1993:2-6; Harbour, 1997:9).  Too many 
measures can result in ‘measurement disintegration’ (Balkcom, 1997:29) as 
well as become an economic burden.  Completeness can be characterized by 
breadth and depth where breadth addresses how many of the system attributes 
are being measured and depth refers to the unit of analysis or ‘granularity’.  
Completeness is also closely related to the concept of balanced measures 
(Kaplan, 1991).  Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive method for 
developing a complete set of measures.  However, achieving completeness 
typically requires both critical and creative thinking in an iterative process 
involving negotiation and compromise among those interested in and 
knowledgeable about the system (Sproles, 2002:258). 
• Measurable – Measures should hold for the representation, uniqueness, and 
meaningfulness conditions.  Additionally, measurable implies within a given 
context if the measure can be feasibly obtained with available resources.  This 
is commonly referred to as being operational (Keeney, 1992:82).  Further, 
measurable implies the collected measures are accurate and can be verified 
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(Artley, 2001b:39).  This is crucial since any system insights gleaned are only 
as good as the measurements taken (Jordan, 2001:15). 
Beyond these specific properties, measures can be categorized based on the type 
of system they represent.  These types include task, process, and object measures.  For 
example, task measures compare a plan versus actual performance.  Process measures, on 
the other hand, are typically used to monitor productivity against a predefined standard, 
benchmark, or goal.  Finally, object measures address specific attributes of a system such 
as physical properties or functions.  Additionally, measures can be grouped by 
dimension.  Single dimensional measures represent fundamental attributes of a system.  It 
follows, multidimensional measures are simply mathematical (linear or multiplicative) 
combinations of single dimensional measures (Artley, 2001b:3). 
The purpose of measurement is to provide meaningful information in support of 
the context (Antony, 1998:18; Jordan, 2001:3).  Measurement alone, however, will not 
provide this information (Leonard, 2004:14).  Measurement, although a crucial element, 
is only a part of the process of system assessment (Wilbur, 1995:16).  Assessment is a 
systematic process of monitoring a system (Blanchard, 1991:14).  Assessment converts 
raw measurement data into information and knowledge yielding insight (Artley, 
2001a:41).  Assessment can be categorized either as enumerative or analytical (Evans, 
2004:219).  Enumerative studies or evaluations are descriptive in nature, describe why a 
system behaved the way it did, and commonly only provide hindsight (Evans, 2004:222). 
Analytical studies, on the other hand, can provide foresight and attempt to 
understand how a system will behave in the future under certain conditions (Meyer, 
2002:49).  Analysis is primarily based on historical measurements which can be 
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problematic since past data may not necessarily be a predictor of future system behavior 
(Meyer, 1997:33).  Thus, analysis insights based on historical measurements assume 
system relations are stable (Lebas, 1995:26).  Further, to objectively state an input had a 
significant system impact requires use of statistical techniques (Evans, 2004:219) 
yielding a confidence statement. 
Assessment, as well as identification of system causal linkages, can be further 
aided through use of tools from the field of Artificial Intelligence such as Support Vector 
Machines, Neural Networks, and Decision Tree Learning (Mitchell, 1997; Cristianini, 
2000).  With any statistical technique, however, there is the possibility of making an 
incorrect inference.  These mistakes are termed Type I and Type II errors.  A Type I 
error, or false-negative, is where a hypothesis is rejected when it is true and a Type II 
error, or false-positive, occurs when a hypothesis is not rejected when it is false. 
Finally, an important, but often underemphasized aspect of system measurement 
is communication, or the design of information (Tufte, 1997:9).  As noted, measurement 
is carried out within a context.  This context could be exploratory or for a resource 
commitment decision.  Modern word-processing, spreadsheet, and database software 
provide flexible means to generate information displays to support the context.  Further, 
some analytical software packages may come with ‘canned’ output reports.  However, 
depending on the context, some methods are better for communicating information than 
others (Tufte, 1997:27).  Additionally, the target audience and intended use of the 
information must be taken into consideration (Jordan, 2001:41).  Effective 
communication of insights via words, numbers, and pictures generally requires creativity.  
Although there are no universal rules for every situation, the goal for an information 
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display should be to present the maximum amount of information possible while ensuring 
unambiguous understanding of the insights and their implications for the target audience 
(Tufte, 1983:105; Jordan, 2001:43).  The key point is regardless of how impeccable the 
measurement plan and implementation, and regardless of how rigorous the assessment, if 
the insights cannot be effectively communicated, then the measurement context was not 
effectively supported (Tufte, 1997:9). 
The previous three sections provided a general survey of measurement concepts 
without an application focus.  The following sections concentrate on measurement for 
military campaign assessment and specifically measurement in support of Effects-based 
Operations (EBO), which will establish specific concepts required for an effectiveness 
measurement framework. 
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS 
We must make the important measurable, not the measurable important. 
      – ROBERT MCNAMARA, 1916 –  
 
Although commonly thought of as an operating concept, Effects-based Operations 
(EBO) is a theory for the employment of capabilities in dynamic and uncertain 
environments in a manner to best attain objectives (Williams, 2002:1).  EBO provides a 
conceptual framework for determining the integration and application of capabilities to 
achieve specific effects, and if correctly applied, influencing an environment of interest 
yielding desired outcomes (Timmerman, 2003:1).  Key tenets of this theory, in the 
military realm, are a focus on end outcomes, reduced emphasis on weapon systems, and 
de-emphasis on destruction as a sole means of achieving effects (Henningsen, 2003:2).  
Another misconception of the theory is EBO requires advanced technology and perfect 
information (Williams, 2002:11).  In fact, concepts concerning EBO are evident in the 
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writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz (Ho, 2003:ii).  The relatively recent resurgence of 
effects-based concepts was not so much a re-discovery, but an effort to institutionalize 
these ideas.  This charge was championed by Major General David A. Deptula (Lowe, 
2004:2).  He suggested air attack with precision weapons as the best means for 
implementing Effects-based Operations (Deptula, 2001b:25).  His emphasis on air power, 
however, alienated many of those outside the Air Force (Williams, 2002:22).  That said, 
EBO is not solely an Air Force approach.  Further, Effects-based Operations is not just a 
military approach.  The concepts of EBO have close parallels to techniques from the 
discipline of Decision Analysis for deriving better decisions to achieve objectives. 
EBO is supported by three pillars: Planning, Employment, and Assessment 
(USJFC, 2003a:B-3).  The major paradigm shift for EBO compared to traditional military 
approaches is in the planning phase, with the focus on the end-state and the effort to 
establish the ‘objective-to-effects-to-node-to-action’ linkages.  Like other approaches, 
EBO is reliant on the efficient employment of capabilities; however, with EBO there is 
an increased emphasis on non-lethal means.  Finally, EBO assessment requires 
determining if the intended effects were achieved and if they are shaping the desired 
outcomes. 
Military EBO planning starts with the desired outcome being articulated by 
senior, civilian decision makers supported by input from military leaders.  Next, the Joint 
Force Commander develops supporting in-theater objectives and the outcomes 
characterizing the end-state, as well as the effects needed to shape those outcomes 
(Williams, 2002:4).  At this point, Measures of Outcome and Measures of Effectiveness, 
along with their associated success criteria, are established (USAF, 2003:7).  After 
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appropriate effects and measures have been selected, courses of action (COAs) can be 
developed and analyzed, where a COA, or strategy, delineates the who, what, where, 
why, when, and how (to include with what resources) (McCrabb, 2002:135).  The 
measures are key to the approach since they tie the three pillars together and are used to 
determine if the intended effects are being achieved and if the strategy and course of 
action needs adjustment (Smith, 2002:355).  Since the planning process starts with the 
end goal and does not apply weapon system or target solutions during COA development, 
inherent to EBO is the application of operational art, allowing the strategist to be flexible 
and innovative. 
Key to the EBO approach is understanding the decision context.  This is achieved 
through the ‘operational net assessment’.  The decision context includes all factors of the 
strategic, operational, and tactical environment, especially those outside the military 
realm such as culture, religion, and economics (Meilinger, 1999:55).  Another important 
part of this decision context is understanding who all the participants are, their objectives, 
and the value each attaches to their objective.  The operational net assessment emphasizes 
the fact that information is a critical enabler for EBO. 
The enduring theme of EBO is always keeping the end-state in sight.  This type of 
approach is certainly not unique to military operations.  Numerous endeavors require a 
strategic view (Da Rocha, 2005:31).  One methodology from the field of Decision 
Analysis, Value Focused Thinking, epitomizes this concept: 
You begin with the fundamental objectives that indicate what you really 
care about in the problem.  Then you follow simple logical reasoning 
processes to identify the mechanisms by which the fundamental objectives 
can be achieved.  Finally, for each mechanism, you create alternatives or 
classes or alternatives by asking what control you have over that 




The above quote suggests EBO is based on a robust and formal framework for 
strategic thinking, yielding strategies for creating effects to influence behavior (Smith, 
2002:108) and an optimum way to approach a wide array of situations (Mann, 2002:43).  
The crux of the challenge in successfully implementing EBO, however, is understanding 
the nature of effects. 
EFFECTS 
There is measure in all things. 
      – HORACE, 65 – 8 B.C. 
 
History has shown warfare is often focused on destruction of the enemy’s military 
forces (McCrabb, 2001:3).  History, however, has also shown efficient prosecution of war 
focuses on strategic ends which are typically not the enemy’s military forces (USAF, 
2003:7).  The end focus is usually some desired end-state where attacks on an enemy's 
military forces are a means to achieve the end-state, but not necessarily the only means; 
use of military force is only one instrument of power.  Other means of influence include 
diplomatic, economic, and informational actions for example.  Regardless of the means, 
efficient prosecution of war must be focused on using only actions, and their supporting 
actions, necessary to shape the end-state, which is accomplished through creation of 
effects. 
A metaphor often used for discussing concepts related to war, which is also useful 
in discussing effects, is comparing an enemy to a system (Warden, 1995), where a system 
is a set of related elements that collectively has some purpose or impact (Bouthonnier, 
1984:48).  The interconnected elements of the enemy typically consists of a directive 
function for leadership and governing with a strategy, or adaptable plan, for addressing 
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the operational environment; essential resources allowing the enemy to exist, such as 
money or even a supportive populous; key supporting infrastructure allowing the enemy 
to translate strategy into action; and some means to carry out strategy, such as armed 
forces.  Effects are generally aimed at affecting one or more of these elements (USAF, 
2003:10). 
Table 3.  Effect Attributes 
 
An effect is a state change in a system brought about by an input to the system 
(Smith, 2002:111; Gallagher, 2004:9; Lowe, 2004:4).  An effect can be categorized in a 
number of different ways (Table 3).  The first attribute of an effect is order.  A first order 
effect, or direct effect, is the result of actions with no intervening mechanism between a 
deliberate action and its corresponding state change.  Higher-order effects, or indirect 
effects, on the other hand, are effects created via intermediate effects, or mechanisms, 
which can be traced back to the original action that brought them about (Lowe, 2004:5).  
Attribute Types 
Order Direct (First-order) Indirect (Higher-order) 
Timing Parallel Sequential 
Impact Cascading Cumulative 
Intent Intended Un-intended (Collateral) 
Result Positive Negative 












Effects can also be classified by timing.  Parallel effects are effects planned to occur at or 
near the same time while sequential effects occur one after another in series. 
Another attribute of effects is impact: cascading or cumulative.  Cascading effects 
ripple through a system, degrading or affecting other associated elements of the systems.  
Cumulative effects, on the other hand, are the aggregation of many smaller direct and 
indirect effects.  Effects can also be described by intent.  Intended effects were expected 
to happen while unintended effects, or collateral effects, were not expected. 
Result is another way to discuss effects.  Correspondingly, effects can have either 
a positive or negative influence on friendly operations (USJFC, 2003b:17).  Effects can 
be classified by persistence as well.  For instance, an effect may be permanent or its 
impact may decay over time.  Domain is another important aspect of effects.  In the 
physical domain, effects are ‘local’ and created by direct impact, through physical 
alteration of an object.  In the functional domain, effects represent an impact on the 
capability, in part of a system, to operate properly (Mann, 2002:37).  Systemic effects, 
however, concern system wide impacts.  Finally, psychological effects are aimed at 
influencing the emotions, motivations, or reasoning of individuals and groups (Mann, 
2002:38).  Alternatively, an effect’s domain can be classified as either physical, 
informational, or cognitive, where the physical domain is where physical actions take 
place, the information domain is where actions are detected and reported to higher 
authority, and the cognitive domain is where decisions as to how to respond at various 
levels are made (Smith, 2002:161; USAF, 2005:3).  Finally, effects can exist at the 







































































































































Figure 7.  Effects and Causal Links 
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The system concept can also be used to describe friendly forces.  Thus, a conflict 
can be viewed as a collision of the system describing friendly forces and the enemy’s 
system.  Using this as a basis, a construct for thinking about and implementing effects 
can be developed (Figure 4).  As noted earlier, a key point, especially with regard to 
measuring results of actions, is delineating system boundaries.  The boundaries of a 
system are where elements of the system interact with elements outside the system.  
Everything outside this boundary is considered a system’s environment. 
Effects result from inputs to a system.  These inputs can be uncontrollable 
environmental factors or they can be driven from within a system, such as when a country 
seeks out and obtains monetary aid.  Inputs can also be driven externally, as when an 
adversary attacks.  In this sense, the adversary’s system is using its own inputs 
(resources) and transforming them into actions.  This output then becomes an input to the 
system being attacked as depicted in Figure 4.  The transformation of inputs to outputs is 
a measure of efficiency and is generally referred to as a Measure of Performance (MOP).  
The adversary’s outputs, or inputs to the system being attacked, create an effect, or state 
change.  The state change is gauged using a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE).  Further, 
the culmination of effects creates some condition or outcome which can be measured by a 
Measure of Outcome (MOO).  These outcomes shape the system’s behavior.  Often no 
distinction is made between MOOs and MOEs with MOOs being assumed as strategic 
level MOEs. 
Figure 4 significantly understates the complexity of the cause-effect chain from a 
deliberate input to a corresponding system state change.  The influence diagram in Figure 
7 gives a better sense of the complexities involved.  However, in reality, identifying and 
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definitively articulating the cause-effect linkages between the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels, as well as the impact of controlled and uncontrolled inputs, is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible (Kaplan, 1996:76; Sink, 1985:86). 
The first aspect of the problem is the abstract nature of the system and the desired 
change.  Essentially, military action is aimed at changing the collective will of a group, 
where ‘will’ has no physical form (Meilinger, 1999:50).  The cause-effect relationships 
are difficult to discern because the system being attacked is actually a system-of-systems.  
The sub-systems are all interconnected, with the output of one sub-system being the input 
to one or more other sub-systems.  Additionally, these sub-systems may be ill-defined, 
hidden, unknown, and/or inaccessible (Leonard, 2004:35).  Further, there may be a 
dynamic delay between a system input and when the impact of that input is detectable 
(USAF, 2003:8).  Finally, the cause-effect relationships can change as the system adapts 
to its new, effects shaped environment (Kaplan, 1996:84). 
The problem of identifying these cause-effect chains is one of the major 
objections to EBO.  The idea that a group of numerical indicators can determine strategic 
progress towards victory will always be in question (Murry, 2001:134).  However, those 
championing EBO have recognized this as a problem and in response have put effort into 
identifying these links as the first step of effects-based planning (USJFC, 2003b:18).  The 
process of uncovering these ‘effect-node-action-resource’ links is called the operational 
net assessment (ONA).  ONA integrates people, processes, and tools to build shared 
knowledge of opposing forces, the environment, and friendly forces.  The focus of ONA 
is to understand key relationships, dependencies, and vulnerabilities within and across 
political, military, economic, social, information and economic systems.  The resultant 
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analysis provides insight on ways to influence an adversary which can then be used to 
develop alternatives for decision makers on how to achieve desired outcomes (USJFC, 
2003b:4).  Despite the emphasis on uncovering these relationships, it is still a very 
challenging endeavor.  However, a number of approaches have been developed to model 
effects. 
MODELING EFFECTS 
I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people. 
      – ISAAC NEWTON, 1642 – 1727 
 
As already suggested, before a system can be measured, it is first necessary to 
know something about the system.  However, the very reason for measuring the system 
may be to obtain an understanding of it.  This line of reasoning suggests, if one wants to 
measure a system, one first has to know something about it, and if one has enough 
knowledge to measure the system then, one can, at least to some degree, model it.  The 
reverse should certainly be true:  If one has modeled a system, implied is that the system 
is understood (at least to the level of modeling), and if the system is understood, insights 
on how to measure the system should be evident.  In fact, one should be able to use the 
model itself as a measuring instrument for the system of interest.  Based on this logic, 
what follows is a review of some of the current approaches to modeling military 
effectiveness.  Although no single approach captures all the concepts surrounding 
military effects, collectively they represent the required, known core elements. 
In general, existing approaches to modeling military effects can be grouped into 




• Non-linear Sciences – The non-linear sciences encompass non-traditional analysis 
techniques from fields such as Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory.  These 
techniques are especially well suited for exploring the non-linear dynamics of 
systems which arise from repeated interaction and feedback (Khalil, 2002).  
Warfare is often characterized in such a manner (Schmitt, 1999:5).  Thus, it is no 
surprise there have been many efforts to use the non-linear sciences to model 
military actions and their resulting effects.  The basic concept behind the non-
linear sciences approach is that cause-effect relationships are modeled implicitly 
and inputs to a system bring about a change or ‘emergent behavior’ resulting from 
the collective consequences of the inputs, where ‘emergent behavior’ is a non-
linear science term for strategic effect (Bullock, 2000:63). 
The US Marine Corp began experimenting with Complexity Theory and 
Chaos Theory, which is typically implemented as a complex adaptive system 
using agent-based modeling, because existing models did not capture the way 
Marines fight with respect to maneuver warfare (Ilachinski, 1997).  The US Air 
Force also explored using agent-based models to capture airpower strategic 
effects (Bullock, 2000).  Although the efforts produced promising results (Hill, 
2003:17), the non-linear sciences typically use a ‘bottom-up’ orientation, 
requiring every element in the system to be modeled and in turn making the non-
linear sciences approach very data intensive and time consuming.  This reality 
would make the non-linear science approach difficult to use for deliberate and 
crisis planning.  In addition, the implicit cause-effect mechanisms can be difficult 
to validate (Champagne, 2003:12).  Because of these obstacles, non-linear science 
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approaches are often considered to be in the realm of fundamental science and 
exploratory analysis (Henningsen, 2003:89). 
• Influence Networks – While the non-linear sciences model cause-effect 
relationships implicitly, influence networks model these mechanisms explicitly.  
Although an influence network is a specific type of tool, here it is also used to 
describe a family of techniques that include Bayesian Networks, System 
Dynamics, and Input-Output models.  In general, these modeling approaches are 
composed of a network of nodes and arcs where the arcs characterize the 
relationships, or flows, between elements in the system represented by the nodes.  
These types of approaches have the flexibility of not only being able to model 
physical networks, such as a communications network, but can address abstract 
processes and situations as well, such as a social network.  The exception to this 
are Input-Output models which typically focus on ‘commodity flows’ on which 
the system elements are dependent (Snodgrass, 2000:7; Snodgrass, 2004). 
There are numerous benefits to using influence network approaches.  
Tools implementing these methods, such as the Situational Influence Analysis 
Model or SIAM (Rosen, 1996), tend to be graphical in nature and thus, have a low 
leaning curve and are very intuitive for the user.  Additionally, the critical 
thinking required to identify the elements in the system being modeled and the 
relationships between the elements has a significant benefit beyond insights 
provided by the model output.  Thus, influence network approaches would greatly 
benefit ONA efforts.  Further, influence networks have been successfully 
integrated with various ‘legacy’ models (Snodgrass, 2000; DeGregorio, 2004). 
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Another important benefit of influence network approaches is they can be 
used as a tool for planning as well as strategy monitoring during plan execution.  
A model built during planning to evaluate courses of action can be transparently 
used to monitor plan progress.  As probabilistic future events come to fruition and 
become known, they can be incorporated into the model as ‘evidence’ providing 
immediate feedback on changes in the probability of success in achieving a 
desired end-state (Levis, 2001:17). 
Despite these benefits, influence network approaches have some 
drawbacks.  In general, influence networks have unidirectional flow and do not 
incorporate feedback.  This makes it difficult to encompass the dynamic interplay 
characterizing a clash between adversaries.  Further, many influence network 
implementations do not include time as an input parameter, which is clearly a 
crucial element in modeling conflict.  However, recent efforts have included time 
to capture the persistence of an effect due to certain actions, providing insight on 
the impact of timing and the synchronization of actions on outcomes, as well as 
yielding insight on the probability of success as a function of time (Levis, 
2001:12).  Additionally, the discipline of System Dynamics, which is focused on 
developing models of dynamical systems, by design includes feedback as well as 
time parameters (Forrester, 2003; Byrnes, 2001). 
• Value-based – Value-based approaches attempt to characterize what is important 
within a decision context and then describe those elements in a mathematical 
formula.  Specifically, the motivation is to determine what is important to ones 
own forces and what is important to the adversary; then protect what is important 
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to you and put what is important to the adversary at risk.  This is the basic concept 
proposed by Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence (1966), despite his 
emphasis on strategic bombing of the populous as the means of influence. 
Value-based models have shown promise in forming the foundation of 
cognitive models of an enemy (Davis, 2001:76; Whittemore, 1999).  Typically, 
however, value-based approaches focus on what is ‘valuable’ from a military 
capability standpoint (Doyle, 1997).  Technically, these approaches specify tasks, 
objectives, and/or values, prioritize them through weighting, and then quantify 
and normalize them on a scale from zero to one.  Success and threshold levels are 
also identified.  With each of the elements weighted so the sum of the weights 
equals one, the elements can be combined into a single mathematical formula 
providing a decision maker an indication of overall accomplishment (Larimer, 
2004). 
Warfare can be described as a clash of highly interconnected system-of-systems 
where ‘soft factors’ driven by the ‘human element’ are pervasive.  While most would say 
this is an accurate description of warfare, the description is certainly not unique to 
warfare.  Other disciplines, such as economics and political science, face the same type of 
conflict modeling challenges faced in the military realm.  Many of the modeling 
approaches in these fields are applicable to combat. 
Arguably, one of the most seminal works in political science attempting to 
characterize conflict is The War Trap (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita, 
1985).  The War Trap presents a mathematically robust, decision-theoretic based, general 
theory of war focused on conflict initiation and escalation.  Although its ‘expected-utility 
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theory of war’ is focused on what causes war, the formulation provides insight on how 
systemically derived statements about conflict and their relationship to empirical 
evidence can lead to generalizations about complex phenomenon. 
The ‘expected-utility theory of war’ model purports to include rational, war-or-
peace decision making with variable orientations towards risk and uncertainty as well as 
adjustments for national power and capabilities.  The goal of the model is to discriminate 
between those who might expect gain from war and those who would expect to suffer a 
net loss if they started a war.  Fundamentally, the model is based on the following factors: 
1) the relative strength of the attacker and the defender, 2) the value the attacker places 
on changing the defender’s policies relative to the possible changes in policies the 
attacker may be forced to accept if it loses, 3) and the relative strength and interests of all 
other states that might intervene in the war. 
While the aim of the ‘expected-utility theory of war’ model was to develop a 
theoretically sound explanation for conflict decision making, it was missing a key 
element: strategic interaction (Maoz, 1985:88).  Expected-utility, and decision theory 
techniques in general, do not account for the impact a decision will have on other 
decision makers and do not factor in the decisions of others for the decision at hand.  This 
deficiency was obviously recognized, as a game-theoretic version of the theory appeared 
in War and Reason (Bueno de Mesquita, 1992). 
Game Theory is a framework for thinking about strategic interaction and helps 
formulate an optimal strategy by forecasting the outcome of strategic situations (Beebe, 
1957:1).  The idea of a general theory of games was introduced by John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, in their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.  
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They describe a game as a competitive situation among two or more decision makers, or 
groups with a common objective, conducted under a prescribed set of rules and known 
outcomes (von Neumann, 1944:49).  The objective of Game Theory is to determine the 
best strategy for a given decision maker under the assumption the other decision makers 
are rational, or consistently make decisions in alignment with some well-defined 
objective, and will make intelligent countermoves, where intelligent implies all decision 
makers have the same information and are capable of inferring the same insights from 
that information (von Neumann, 1944:51). 
Clearly, strategic interaction is a crucial component when analyzing international 
conflict or economic situations.  Although War and Reason and Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior are focused on conflict at a strategic level, Game Theory has proven 
to be useful for characterizing interaction at the operational and tactical levels as well 
(Hamilton, 2004:3).  Despite a rich history in military modeling, Game Theory is 
noticeably absent in EBO modeling approaches.  Although the focus of this research is on 
measuring effects versus modeling them, the concepts behind Game Theory are important 
in understanding the military measurement context (Gartner, 1997:5).  A more detailed 
review of Game Theory can be found in Appendix A. 
CURRENT STATUS 
...things are to you such as they appear to you 
and to me such as they appear to me... 
      – PROTAGORAS, 485 – 421 B.C. 
 
Currently there is no explicit, theoretical foundation for measuring effectiveness.  
Additionally, attempts at just defining effects concepts have focused on action verbs 
which violate the requirement for effects to be invariant to means of achievement 
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(Gallagher, 2004:9).  Given that these measures provide feedback on strategic direction 
and thus, significantly influence irrevocable decisions concerning allocation of scarce 
resources, a Theory of Effectiveness Measurement is needed.  The purpose of such a 
theory would not be to replicate reality in a specific domain, but to provide a coherent, 
organized approach to understanding complex, real events in general.  Such a theory 
would be based on theorems, axioms and assumptions providing a basis for simplifying 
and organizing reality by delineating the precise conditions and domain where the theory 
holds, and the ramifications when the conditions are violated.  Such axioms and theorems 
would help the analyst discriminate critical phenomenon from incidental phenomenon, 
providing a basis for simplifying a complex reality without distorting its essential 
characteristics (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981:10; Gartner, 1997:9).  Clearly, there are no 
definitive measures which can be prescribed for every objective across every application 
area (Fenton, 1994:200; Park, 1996:1).  Because of this, effectiveness measurement 
concepts need to be defined in general along with the mathematical properties that 
characterize these concepts, regardless of the specific attributes to which the concepts are 
applied. 
Key elements supporting a Theory of Effectiveness Measurement include precise 
definition of concepts, theorems and properties concerning the concepts, and a formalized 
notation for discussing the concepts in terms of mathematics.  Under propositional logic, 
such an axiomatic-based theory would ensure proof of logically true propositions.  
However, logical proof does not necessarily guarantee anything of interest will be 
revealed.  A logically true, but empirically trivial or irrelevant theory is of little 
operational value (Wacker, 2004: 631).  With respect to war, too many seemingly valid 
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measures may provide a confusing and competing indication of strategic performance.  
Additionally, interpretation of measures can be problematic even when the inherent noise 
accompanying factual information is discounted (Gartner, 1997:8).  Therefore, this 
research includes an empirically feasible framework demonstrating the benefits of the 
theory, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the sections to follow. 
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THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
III.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
OBJECTIVE & TASKS 
The objective of this research was to develop a theoretically-based, but 
empirically feasible approach to measuring effectiveness.  Theoretically-based implies 
mathematically rigorous and a connection to existing, established theories.  Empirically 
feasible, on the other hand, implies robustness, intuitiveness, and practicality.  To achieve 
these somewhat conflicting sub-objectives required the following new contributions. 
1) Scope Problem – This task involved establishing a foundation for approaching 
the problem of measuring effectiveness.  The task required developing a conceptual 
construct and bounding the problem in such a way as to ensure precision when 
mathematical operators are applied.  However, the framework needed to be flexible 
enough to accommodate a wide array of domains and measurement endeavors.  This task 
was accomplished by integrating the concepts of effects and EBO into the 
representational view of measurement. 
2) Define Concepts – Effects and EBO have been areas of critical interest in the 
DoD since the 1991 Gulf War.  Because of this, numerous efforts originating within the 
DoD and external to it, including international efforts, have sought to develop a widely 
accepted effects lexicon.  Unfortunately, the goal has yet to be met and a precise, 
operational definition of effects for EBO is still being debated (Gallagher, 2004:9).  This 




3) Develop Notation – The purpose for developing notation was to establish a 
formal language in order to discuss the qualitative concepts of effects in quantitative, 
mathematical terms.  Since the theory resulting from this research is generic and not tied 
to any specific domain or measurement effort, this step was critical since mathematics 
allows the potential for truth to be established independent of reality (Zuse, 1998:7).  
Additionally, mathematical notation was a critical enabler for accomplishing the next step 
of establishing the theory (Wacker, 2004: 632). 
4) Establish Theory – The purpose of effectiveness measurement is to obtain 
objective information for use in strategic decision-making.  However, one cannot be 
assured of objective information from effectiveness measurements unless they are based 
on a firm theoretical foundation (Zuse, 1998:9).  This final task, building off the previous 
three, established such a foundation.  Because of the desire for the theory to be domain 
independent, an axiomatic approach was used.  The axioms represent basic assumptions 
about reality.  Clearly, such a rule-based framework will not hold under all 
circumstances.  However, the advantage of an axiomatic approach is that the conditions 
under which the theory holds can be clearly delineated (Zuse, 1998:10). 
The above four tasks represent the core contributions of this research.  In 
summary, task one establishes a formal context for thinking about effectiveness 
measurement.  Task two develops unique terminology for effectiveness measurement.  
Task three, then devises notation, or in-other-words, the syntax of effectiveness 
measurement.  Finally, task four, through a framework of axioms, creates a mechanism 
for selecting, interpreting, and comparing effectiveness measurements, or essentially, the 
semantics of effectiveness measurement. 
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The above four tasks yield a deterministic, effectiveness measurement framework.  
‘Deterministic’ implies perfect information.  As noted in a previous section, however, 
uncertainty and error in measurement is inescapable.  Additionally, some would suggest 
the crux of the problem in measuring effectiveness is uncertainty (Murray, 2001; Glenn, 
2002; Bowman, 2002).  Thus, a probabilistic framework for reasoning about this error 
and uncertainty is needed. 
The uncertainty exists at many levels.  Since for most domains of interest, key 
attributes will not likely have a direct, natural measure, proxy measures will have to be 
used.  This is tantamount to developing a model of the attribute.  Thus, the first aspect of 
uncertainty concerns whether the model spans the attribute, or in-other-words, if the 
model is collectively exhaustive.  Another, perhaps more fundamental issue of 
uncertainty, involves whether the right measures are being used to represent a system 
attribute.  A final aspect of uncertainty involves the measurements themselves.  Each 
measurement, or observation, is essentially a draw from some distribution; however, 
numerous draws from the distribution may be costly, time prohibitive, or just not 
possible.  In fact, many circumstances may only allow for one observation (e.g. satellite 
image).  Thus, the uncertainty is in the form of not knowing where on the distribution the 
obtained observation lies (i.e. is it at the mean or an outlier). 
There are a number of established approaches in other fields for dealing with 
these types of uncertainty including Kalman filters, Bayesian techniques, and the Theory 
of Evidence to name a few.  This research task, addressing probabilistic reasoning, 
explored these approaches within the context of measuring effectiveness, establishing the 
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benefits and downside to each, in an effort to determine which technique best supported 
the deterministic framework. 
All the above tasks, resulting in the deterministic and probabilistic frameworks for 
measuring effectiveness, complete the Theory of Effectiveness Measurement.  However, 
a key goal of the research was to ensure the resulting effectiveness measurement 
methodology was pragmatic.  Thus, to meet this final research objective, the frameworks 
were demonstrated in a military scenario.  This entailed systematizing the theory into a 
series of steps for application to effectiveness measurement problems.  Additionally, this 
involved demonstrating the consequences of violating the conditions set forth in the 
axioms of the theory.  A key impediment to accomplishing this final task was availability 
of data.  Most available data on historical military battles is attrition-based and not effect-
based oriented.  Thus, a notional scenario was developed in a combat simulation model 
called Point of Attack.  Output data from the scenario was then used as a basis for 
demonstrating the effectiveness measurement frameworks. 
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THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
IV.  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
DETERMINISTIC FRAMEWORK 
The first step in developing a Theory of Effectiveness Measurement is 
establishing a philosophical view of effects.  While the purpose for creating effects is 
commonly understood, there is less consensus on the conceptual meaning of an effect as 
evidenced by the number of effect attribute combinations (Table 3).  Current effects 
literature is dominated by a verb-centric philosophy, implying an effect is a consequence, 
or result, of a particular action.  However, significant confusion arises from this approach 
due to different interpretations and the imprecise meanings of words (Gallagher, 2004:9).  
A more precise paradigm is to simply view an effect as a change, or more specifically a 
system state-change (USAF, 2003:8, USJFC, 2003:17). 
For example, let an empirical SYSTEM of interest, A, with ELEMENTs, a, be 
represented as A = 〈 a1,…, an 〉 where ai ∈ a, for i = 1 to n, are the elements, or 
SUBSYSTEMs, germane to the measurement context.  For a world actor, United States 
Joint Forces Command defines these elements as political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructure, and information sub-systems, or PMESII (USJFC, 2003b:16).  
Additionally, ‘of interest’ implies there is a clearly defined, desired behavior, or END-
STATE, for A, and if the current behavior differs from the desired behavior, some action 
will be taken. 
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Further, let xA = 〈 x1,…, xn 〉 be the formal representation of the empirical system, 
or the MODEL, where xi ∈ x are formal representations of ai ∈ a.  Alternatively, the 
formal representation could be a function of the elements, xA = f( x1,…, xn ).  
Additionally, for i = 1 to n, let xi = 〈 α1,…, αm 〉, where αj ∈ α, for j = 1 to m, are the 
relevant ATTRIBUTEs (or NODEs) characterizing element xi, out of all possible 
attributes, α.  These attributes are identified during the Operational Net Assessment, 
along with LINKs, or the relationships between attributes (McCrabb, 2001:28), and 
MECHANISMs which explain the causal and temporal aspects of system wide changes 
(Gill, 1996:175).  Finally, both the elements, xi, and the attributes, αj, can be reduced to 
facilitate quantification yielding xi = f( xi1,…, xin ) and αj = f( αj1,…, αjm ). 
A MEASUREMENT, or observation, is a particular manifestation or instantiation of 
an attribute (McCrabb, 2001:28).  System attributes provide a true gauge of the system 
status.  With respect to system measurement, attributes can be broadly categorized by 
awareness and measurability.  Thus, attributes can be known and measurable, unknown 
and measurable, known and un-measurable, or unknown and un-measurable.  If an 
attribute is known and measurable, the measurement task is relatively straightforward 
since the attribute will likely have a natural and direct measure (e.g. money, time).  Most 
attributes of interest, however, cannot be directly measured and require an indirect, or 
proxy MEASURE, ά, where ά ≈ α.  Further, several proxy measures may be required to 
assess a particular attribute yielding αj ≈ f( άj1,…, άjp ), where p is the number of 
measures used to characterize αj.  Additionally, a measure, άj1, could be composed of 
lower level measures (i.e. άj1 = f( άj11,…, άj1q )), where q is the number of measures used 
to characterize the higher level measure, άj1.  The lowest level measures can be 
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considered ‘atomic’ measures, since they cannot be further reduced.  Finally, a system 
STATE, St, is a particular instantiation of all atomic measures and thus, an instantiation of 
all system attributes (or state variables) at a particular point in time, t (Lowe, 2004:4). 
Anything not encompassed in x is considered to be the system’s ENVIRONMENT 
where system INPUTS originate.  Inputs can be deliberate or can be uncontrollable 
environmental factors.  Deliberate inputs, or control variables, are derivative of 
RESOURCES, y.  Like atomic attributes, or attributes that cannot be reduced into more 
basic attributes, resources are primitives, or basic inputs, and consist of essentials such as 
information, money, people, and equipment.  When choreographed and orchestrated, the 
resources become a means of influence (Mann, 2002:30), or a CAPABILITY, C.  
Formally, C = f( y ), assuming the capability to plan and bring together resources is also a 
resource.  It should be noted, capability, as it is used here, implies more than material 
capabilities, but encompasses the ability to exercise influence, as well as the ability to 
resist the influence attempts of others (Geller, 1998:57). 
It follows, an EFFECT, E, is a system state change, or a change in one or more of 
the system state variables.  Additionally, time, t, is a fundamental parameter in measuring 
effectiveness since inputs do not yield instantaneous results, but propagate, culminate, 
and dissipate in a system over time (McCrabb, 2001:10).  Further, these system changes 
are brought about by the inputs (Lowe, 2004:4).  As noted, inputs can be controllable and 
uncontrollable so, system INFLUENCE can be stated as I = f( C, InputsUncontrollable ), 














Figure 8.  Concept of Effectiveness Measurement 
Table 4.  Fundamental Definitions 
 
DEFINITION 1: A SYSTEM is a set of elements where relationships exist between 
the elements and the SYSTEM has a purpose or normative 
behavior. 
 
DEFINITION 2: A system ELEMENT, or SUBSYSTEM, is a system providing 
functionality or support to a parent system. 
 
DEFINITION 3: A MODEL is a formal image of an empirical structure. 
 
DEFINITION 4: An ATTRIBUTE, or NODE, is a characteristic, feature, or 
property of a system that is directly or indirectly observable. 
 
DEFINITION 5: A MEASURE is a model of an attribute. 
 
DEFINITION 6: A MEASUREMENT, or observation, is a particular manifestation, 
or instantiation, of an attribute. 
 
DEFINITION 7: A system STATE is a particular instantiation of all system 
attributes, or state variables, at a particular point in time. 
 
DEFINITION 8: An EFFECT is a system state change. 
 
DEFINITION 9: EFFECTIVENESS gauges the magnitude of a system state 
change. 
 
DEFINITION 10: An END-STATE characterizes the desired measurements for all 
system attributes, or state variables. 
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xA = < 0, 0,…, 0, 0 > xA = <  -.2, .7,…, .3, .5 > xA = < 1, 1,…, 1, 1 >
Effectiveness
(of inputt = 0 at t = T)
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EFFECTIVENESS gauges the magnitude of a system state change due to these 
influences.  Thus, EFFECTIVENESS = Δ( xA, t = 0, xA, t = T ) ≈ Δ( At = 0, At = T ) gauges the 
system impact from controllable and uncontrollable inputs between time t = 0 and time    
t = T.  Finally, a key point is while an effect occurs on the empirical system, effectiveness 
is measured on the formal system.  The precise definition of these concepts, along with 
their formalized language in terms of mathematical notation, is a cornerstone required for 
formal theory building (Wacker, 2004: 632).  Figure 8 summarizes these concepts 
pictorially.  In addition, Table 4 highlights definitions of key concepts to be extended in 
what follows. 
Although Figure 8 addresses the concept of effectiveness in a generic sense, 
Figure 8 does not imply a general notion of effectiveness.  This is a problem in the 
current literature which typically addresses effectiveness in generalities.  For example, in 
response to an action, the question, “How effective was it?,” has no meaning.  In fact, it 
can be shown analytically a general-purpose, real-valued effectiveness measure, with the 
minimum assumption of an ordinal scale, does not exist. 
THEOREM 1:  A general notion of effectiveness does not exist. 
 
PROOF:  Let S be the set of all possible system states and Si, t=T ∈ S be the 
system state at time t = T resulting from input i.  Additionally, let St=0 be 
the starting system state and Se be the desired end-state.  For independent 
system inputs, x and y at t = 0, system effectiveness is characterized by an 
empirical relation system which includes the relation <E, Se, where <E, Se 
can be interpreted as “is less effective than, with respect to Se” and E is the 
measure of effectiveness of the input with respect to Se at t = T.  However, 
for such a formalism to exist requires E: S × Se → R ∋ <E, Se holds ∀S ∈ S.  
This suggests Sx, t=T <E, Se Sy, t=T ⇒ E(x) < E(y).  While <E, Se may clearly 
hold for some states, others states at time t = T resulting from inputs x and 
y will not be comparable due to imprecision in the meaning of 
‘effectiveness’.  This suggests <E, Se is not a total order on S × Se while < is 
a total order on R.  This violates Cantor’s Theorem (Fenton, 1994:201); 
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specifically, the negative transitivity aspect of the strict weak order 
property: ∀ Sx,y,z, t=T ∈ S, (Sx, t=T <E, Se Sy, t=T ⇒  (Sx, t=T <E, Se Sz, t=T ∨ Sz, t=T 
<E, Se Sy, t=T)).  
 
To illustrate the consequences of this theorem, using Figure 8 as a reference, let 
there be two actions, y and z.  At t = T, y results in xA = 〈 -.2, .7,…, .3, .5 〉 while z results 
in xA = 〈 .8, .5,…, -.4, .4 〉.  Which action, y or z, was more effective?  THEOREM 1 
asserts this question cannot be answered.  Thus, effectiveness measurements must always 
be with respect to specific system attributes from which it follows, E: S × Se must be 
mathematically complete (i.e. ∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si ≤E, Se Sj) ∨ (Sj ≤E, Se Si))). 
Clearly, however, developing a universal set of system attribute effectiveness 
measures is futile.  But, an axiomatic framework can provide a sound foundation and 
guidance for developing all specific system effectiveness measures.  Thus, although there 
is no general notion of effectiveness, for specific effectiveness measures, there is a need 
to define effectiveness measurement concepts and define precisely the mathematical 
properties that characterize these concepts, regardless of the specific system attributes to 
which these concepts are applied. 
In Measurement Theory, the empirical understanding of a system attribute is 
formalized through definition of an empirical relational system.  A measure is valid if it is 
a homomorphism from the empirical relational system into a formal relational system, or 
in other words, if the measure maps system attributes into values such that all empirical 
relations among the attributes are preserved as formal relations among the measurement 
values (Poels, 2000:35).  Clearly, the crux of the problem in effectiveness measurement is 
most aspects of the empirical relational system, such as links and mechanisms, are ill-
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defined or unknown.  However, the empirical aspects of a system that are known can be 
formalized as a set of desirable properties for the system measures.  Thus, instead of 
explicitly defining the formal relational system, an axiomatic approach defines properties 
for the formal system based on properties of the empirical relational system (Poels, 
2000:35). 
The entire field of mathematics is axiomatic-based where concepts are defined 
using necessary and sufficient sets of rules.  One such concept, from Measure Theory, is 
called a metric.  As noted earlier, in measurement practice, a metric generally represents 
a system of measurement composed of the system attributes, the units of measurement, 
and unit reference standards (Geisler, 2000:75).  In mathematics, however, a metric has a 
precise definition which is developed in this section.  First, however, to define a metric, 
or a ‘measure of distance’, a measurable space needs to be defined. 
An algebra, on a set S, is a collection, A, of subsets of S where S, Ø ⊂ A, A ∈ A 





 ∈ A.  In 
other words, an algebra is a collection of subsets of S, which contains S and is closed 
under the complement and finite union.  In this context, A is a measurable set.  Further, A 
is a σ-algebra when ∀i, i ∈ Z+, Ai ∈ A ⇒U
∞
=1i
iA  ∈ A.  Additionally, a measure, µ, is a 
non-negative set function on the σ-algebra, A, where µ(Ø) = 0, ∀A, B ∈ A, (A ∩ B) = Ø, 
µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B), and A = U
∞
=1i
iA ⇒µ(A) = ∑∞=1i μ (Ai) (countably additive).  It 
follows, (S, A, µ) is a measure space and (S, A) is a measurable space (Ruckle, 1991:80-
81).  A familiar example of these spaces is Cartesian space.  With these fundamental 
constructs established, a metric can now be defined. 
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A metric, δ, is a type of measure that gauges distances between entities.  
Specifically, a metric on a set S is a function δ: S × S → R+ ∋ ∀Si, Sj, Sk ∈ S, δ(Si, Sj) ≥ 0 
(non-negativity), δ(Si, Sj) = 0 ⇔  Si = Sj (identity), δ(Si, Sj) = δ(Sj, Si) (symmetry), and 
δ(Si, Sj) ≤ δ(Si, Sk) + δ(Sk, Sj) (triangle inequality), where × denotes the Cartesian product, 
or all ordered pairs of vectors in S (Marlow, 1978:2).  Additionally, if the second 
condition, δ(Si, Sj) = 0 ⇔  Si = Sj, is replaced with δ(Si, Sj) = 0 ⇒  Si = Sj, then δ is a 
semimetric or psudeo-metric (Cohn, 1980:8).  It follows, (S, δ) is a metric space.  The 
above demonstrates how mathematics, and specifically Measure Theory, defines a 
measure via rules or axioms.  Through the use of an axiomatic approach, measures can be 
‘validated’, where sufficiency is guaranteed by proving invariance with respect to the rule 
set. 
Measure Theory only addresses formal systems.  Measurement Theory, on the 
other hand, is focused on mapping empirical systems to these formal structures.  In other 
words, the formal representations are numerical structures used to represent the empirical 
systems.  Dimensional metric models, which are numerical representation of qualitative 
structures with coordinate-vector representations, using primitives such as points and 
comparative distances, are often used as the formal structures.  Dimensional metric 
models are based on two general concepts: 1) the representation of objects as points in a 
coordinate space and, 2) the use of metric distance to represent proximity between the 
points (Suppes, 1989:207).  The most basic Dimensional metric model is a Geometrical 
model (spatial), which depicts objects as points in a space such that the proximity 
ordering of the objects is represented by the ordering of the metric distances among the 
respective points (Suppes, 1989:159).  A familiar example of such a representation is 
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points in n-dimensional Euclidean space, which is a particular type of metric space.  The 
Measure Theory axioms required for a metric to be a measure on a formal structure were 
identified earlier.  It will be shown in what follows, a metric is also a measure according 
to Measurement Theory when axioms defining a proximity structure are satisfied. 
A proximity structure represents empirical relations, but is also a metric space in 
which any two points are joined by a straight line segment, along which distance is 
additive, yielding an ordering among the entities (Suppes, 1989:7).  To further elaborate 
on proximity structures, let ≤S, <S, =S be quaternary relations on S where                      
∀Si, Sj, Sk, Sl ∈ S, (Si, Sj) ≤S (Sk, Sl) means the difference, or conceptual distance, between 
Si and Sj is at most as great as the distance between Sk and Sl, (Si, Sj) <S (Sk, Sl) implies the 
distance between Si and Sj is not as great as the distance between Sk and Sl, and (Si, Sj) =S 
(Sk, Sl) suggests the distance between Si and Sj is the same as the distance between Sk and 
Sl.  It follows, (S, ≤S) is a proximity structure if and only if ∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si ≤S Sj) ∨      
(Sj ≤S Si)) (strongly complete), ∀ Si, Sj, Sk ∈  S, (((Si ≤S Sj) ∧ (Sj ≤S Sk)) ⇒  (Si ≤S Sk)) 
(transitive or consistent), ∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si ≠ Sj) ⇒  ((Si, Si) <S (Si, Sj))) (positivity),    
∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si, Si) =S (Sj, Sj)) (minimality), and ∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si, Sj) =S (Sj, Si)) 
(symmetry).  Thus, δ is both a formal and empirical metric, or measure of distance, if and 
only if, ∀Si, Sj, Sk, Sl ∈ S, (Si, Sj) ≤S (Sk, Sl)⇔ δ(Si, Sj) ≤ δ(Sk, Sl) (Suppes, 1989:160). 
This suggests every function satisfying the metric axioms is by definition a valid 
measure of distance when the system is a proximity structure.  In a similar manner, weak 
ordering on a metric space gives rise to a proximity structure (Suppes, 1989:162).  This 
implies effectiveness measures can be defined to measure the differences, or conceptual 
distances, between system states.  Thus, what follows is a framework for system 
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effectiveness measurement where measures, άj, for empirical system attributes, αj, are 
defined to hold for the properties of a metric giving rise to system state-spaces satisfying 
the properties of a proximity structure.  System effectiveness measurement then, is the 
difference, or conceptual distance, from a given system state to some reference system 
state (e.g. end-state).  By defining system attribute measures such that they yield system 
state-spaces characterized as proximity structures, differences in system states relative to 
a reference state over time can be gauged, resulting in an axiomatic definition of 
effectiveness measurement. 
The proximity structure is not the only way to formally represent a system.  There 
are numerous other types of structures.  These include Grassmann structures (Krantz, 
1971:229) and difference structures (Zuse, 1998:250) to name a few.  These structures 
are essentially axiomatic system models.  No particular structure is more correct than 
another.  Choice of a structure, or formal model, depends on empirical system 
assumptions, empirical system hypotheses, and the measurement context.  For example, 
to prove the properties of an extensive structure (Krantz, 1971:72) requires various 
combination rules such as concatenation (i.e. addition) hold.  However, this implies the 
elements in the measure space represented by the extensive structure have meaning if 
combined.  This may be true for many empirical systems, but for the effectiveness 
measurement framework presented here, there is no empirical meaning behind arbitrary 
combinations of systems states (i.e. points).  That being said, the proximity structure is 




It should be noted, ‘valid’ as it is used here, implies theoretical validity suggesting 
the measure, άj, satisfies all of the axioms established to define the formal system, or 
model.  Although definition of system attributes as distances, during the ONA, should 
reflect empirical understanding of the system attributes, theoretical validity does not 
imply empirical validity.  To define an empirically valid measure, however, requires 
certainty about the underlying structure of the empirical system to include attributes, 
links, and mechanisms.  Clearly, for real-world systems, especially for those as complex 
as in the military realm, this information will be less than certain.  Despite this 
uncertainty, to develop a framework to make quantitative statements about a qualitative, 
or empirical, system requires a specification, or product structure, for the system; in other 
words, a robust process for developing the system model, xA.  Such processes can be 
found in Decision Theory, and specifically Value Focused Thinking (Keeney, 1992), 
where structured processes are used to reduce an abstract objective of a complex decision 
problem into values indicating why the problem is important and further, into 
quantifiable attributes that can be used to rank order alternatives to achieve the objective.  
One such process, modified to serve as a generic system state specification, or product 
structure, for the purpose of measuring effectiveness, is described in the steps below. 
1.  System Identification.  This first step is crucial since it 
determines the system boundary.  An empirical system, A, and its formal 
representation, xA, should encompass all pertinent aspects of a desired 
end-state. 
2.  Sub-system Identification.  For the identified empirical system, 
A, and its formal representation, xA, identify empirical sub-systems,         
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ai ∈ a, and their formal representations, xi ∈ x, where A = 〈 a1,…, an 〉 ≈ xA 
= 〈 x1,…, xn 〉.  An empirical system, A, will likely have many possibilities 
for decomposition into smaller sub-systems, ai ∈ a.  Choice of sub-
systems should be limited to those that support the measurement context.  
Additionally, like the parent system, each sub-system will have its own 
boundary within the parent system.  Ideally, the sub-systems should be 
defined in such a way that sub-systems are disjoint, or mutually exclusive, 
from other sub-systems.  It should be noted, however, empirical systems 
of interest are often highly interconnected and mutually exclusivity may 
not be achievable (i.e. A = 〈 a1 〉).  Further, subject matter expert, mental 
models may have to be used when there is little understanding about 
system interconnectivity. 
3.  Define Sub-system Relative Importance.  All identified sub-
systems should be relevant to the measurement context; however, they 
may not all have the same level of relevancy.  For all sub-systems, the 
relative importance among sub-systems must be defined.  This amounts to 
weighting each of the sub-systems with respect to the other sub-systems.  
This can be done by developing a number (Keeney, 1992:148), wxi, for 




wxi = 1. 
4.  Attribute (Node) Identification.  Each sub-system, xi ≈ ai, can be 
characterized by certain salient features, or attributes, αj.  Like the sub-
systems, there will likely be a number of attributes from which to choose.  
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However, only attributes relevant to the measurement context should be 
used.  Thus, for each sub-system, xi, with attributes αj, xi = 〈 α1,…, αm 〉 
for j = 1 to m, where m is the number of relevant sub-system attributes. 
5.  Define Attribute (Node) Relative Importance.  Like the sub-
systems, all identified attributes, αj, should be relevant to the measurement 
context but, they may not all have the same level of relevancy.  For all 
attributes within a sub-system, the relative importance among the 
attributes must be defined.  Again, this amounts to weighting each of the 
attributes with respect to the other attributes within a sub-system.  This 
can be done by developing a number (Keeney, 1992:148), wαj, for each 




wαji = 1. 
6.  Measure Development.  Each attribute, αj, needs to be 
quantified.  Attributes may need to be further reduced for quantification 
purposes.  The basic measure development approach is to iteratively 
decompose the attribute into more basic attributes until they are so 
narrowly defined, a measure for attribute αj, άj, suggests itself (Sink, 
1985:86).  These will typically be in terms of counts (e.g. number of 
sightings in a day). 
If the above reductionist approach does not yield atomic attributes 
with natural measures, constructed measures have to be used (Keeney, 
1992:103).  The first step in building a constructed measure for an 
attribute is to characterize the desired end-state, as well as the starting 
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state, in terms of the attribute.  Then, define possible intermediate states 
between the starting state and end-state, or in-other-words, construct a 
model of the distance between states of xA ≈ A with respect to άj ≈ αj.  
Additional system states in the neighborhood of the starting state should 
also be defined to encompass possible negative consequences, or 
deliberate system inputs that lead away from the desired end-state.  
Definition of the intermediate states, essentially defines the units for the 
constructed measure άj.  Regardless of type of measure, however, natural 
or constructed, άj needs to hold for the properties of a metric.  That is, 
each άj must hold for non-negativity, identity, symmetry, and the triangle 
inequality properties.  A measure, άj, meeting these properties will be 
identified by δαj to signify it is both a measure of αj and a metric.  Thus, 
δαj ≈ αj. 
Using this procedure as a system state specification, the following framework 
proposes ∀ Sk, Se ∈  S, δ(Sk, Se): S × Se → R+, or in other words, the proximity ordering 
by metric distance, be used as a measure of the difference, or conceptual distance, 
between state Sk, and the desired end-state, Se, where S is the set of all possible system 
states.  By defining attributes, δαj ≈ αj, based on the system state specification, δ(Sk, Se) is 
a valid metric from both a Measure Theory and Measurement Theory perspective.  
However, as will be shown, assuming system state Sk characterizes the empirical system 
through two or more attributes, δ(Sk, Se) is actually a semimetric, or pseudo-metric, since 
any two states in S can be different across attributes, but have the same conceptual 
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distance to the reference state.  Thus, only atomic measures, δαj, are pure metrics in the 
mathematical sense. 
Clearly, under this framework, a system state (i.e. point) by itself has no 
measurement.  The concept of a difference, or conceptual distance, requires two states 
(i.e. the system state of interest, Sk, and a reference system state, such as the end-state, 
Se).  Thus, for a set of possible system states, S, the empirical relation system consists of 
a set of entities and their relations.  Comparison of all pairwise combinations of system 
states is denoted by S × S.  However, if the reference system state is Se, this reduces to S 
× Se, where each atomic attribute addresses a unique aspect (i.e. dimension) of system 
state difference.  Thus, the focus here is on the differences, or conceptual distances, 
between system states, and more importantly for effectiveness measurement, a relation 
expressing a total order on S × Se.  The empirical ordering relation for system states can 
be expressed as ≤S, where ≤S is a ternary relation mapping to the positive real numbers, 
R+.  Thus, δS:(S × Se, ≤S) → (R+, ≤) is a homomorphic mapping suggesting                  
∀Si, Sj, Se ∈ S ∋ (Si, Se) ≤S (Sj, Se) ⇔  δ(Si, Se) ≤ δ(Sj, Se), from which it follows          
δS:(S × Se, ≤S) is of at least ordinal scale type.  This useful result suggests, 
THEOREM 2:  Effectiveness measures require at least an ordinal scale 
type. 
 
PROOF:  For an ordinal scale effectiveness measure, δS:(S × Se, ≤S) → (R+, 
≤) implying δS has both equivalence and rank order meaning on S × Se.  
However, a nominal scale measure, μS:(S × Se, =S) → (R+, =), only has 
equivalence meaning over S × Se.  Thus, ∀ Si, Sj ∈  S, ((Si ≤S Sj) ∨ (Sj ≤S 
Si) (strongly complete)) and ∀ Si, Sj, Sk ∈  S, (((Si ≤S Sj) ∧ (Sj ≤S Sk)) ⇒  (Si 
≤S Sk)) (transitive or consistent)) cannot be discerned with μS, the nominal 




To further illustrate, let A be an empirical system with one element a, where the 
element has one attribute, α, measured by ά.  Thus, the model of A = xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 μα 〉 
and S is the space of all possible assignments to μα.  Further, let St=0, the starting state, be 
xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 Ø 〉 and Se, the desired end-state, be xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 ψ 〉.  Additionally, let there 
be two actions, y and z.  At t = T, y results in xA = 〈 χ 〉 while z results in xA = 〈 φ 〉.  Which 
action, y or z, was more effective in terms of α?  THEOREM 2 asserts this question can 
not be answered for the nominal system state measure μS.  A key result following from 
THEOREM 2, in combination with the mathematical completeness implication of 
THEOREM 1, is (S × Se, ≤S) is of weak order.  It can further be shown however, δS not 
only has ordinal meaning, but has meaning on the ratio scale as well. 
THEOREM 3:  The effectiveness measure δS:(S × Se, ≤S) → (R+, ≤) is of 
ratio scale type. 
 
PROOF:  The admissible transformation for a ratio scale type measure is x 
→ rx, r ∈ R+.  Because Se is used as the second parameter in each pair for 
the ternary relation (i.e. (Si, Se) ≤S (Sj, Se)), Se acts as an absolute zero for 
δS.  Thus, ∀r ∈ R+, for the relation ∀Si, Sj, Se ∈ S ∋ (Si, Se) ≤S (Sj, Se) → 
rδS(Si, Se) ≤ rδS(Sj, Se) ⇒  δS(Si, Se) ≤ δS(Sj, Se).  
 
To further illustrate, let A be an empirical system with one element a, where the 
element has one attribute α, measured by ά.  Thus, the model of A = xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 δα 〉 and 
S is the space of all possible assignments to δα.  Further, let St=0, the starting state, be A = 
xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 9 〉 and Se, the desired end-state be A = xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 2 〉.  Let there be two 
actions, y and z.  At t = T, y results in xA = 〈 6 〉 while z results in xA = 〈 3 〉.  In this 




An obvious question is, why not use the starting state St=0, as the reference state 
versus Se?  The starting state does not represent an absolute zero for δS thus, coming into 
conflict with the non-negativity property of a metric (i.e. δS ≥ 0).  To illustrate, using the 
above example with starting state xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 9 〉 and desired end-state xA = 〈 α 〉 ≈ 〈 2 〉, 
at t = T, let y result in xA = 〈 6 〉, which is clearly an improvement from St=0 since it is 
closer to Se.  However, suppose z results in xA = 〈 15 〉.  If the state change is measured 
from St=0, resulting in 9 - 15 = -6, the non-negativity property is violated.  Additionally, 
in an attempt to get around the non-negativity constraint, if the measure is referenced 
from t = T resulting in 15 - 9 = 6, while non-negative, it is now not comparable to the 
result from y.  The logic for using the end-state as a reference point is similar to that used 
in goal programming where outcomes are measured with respect to the desired goal 
(Deckro, 1988:152). 
THEOREM 1 asserts a general notion of effectiveness does not exist.  Clearly 
however, system attribute measures, δαj need to be mathematically combined to derive a 
single, scalar system effectiveness measure, δS.  Although a single scalar facilitates 
comparison of system states, whether this mathematical combination has empirical 
significance under the Representation Theorem in Measurement Theory is questionable.  
For example, suppose a set of boxes is of interest.  The specific attributes of interest are 
length, width, and height.  Instead of representing each box as a vector of length, width, 
and height, which would be a unique representation for each box, the product of the three 
is used.  The problem is the derived measure does not provide an isomorphic mapping 
from the empirical world to the formal structure (e.g. a box 40cm wide, 30cm long, and 
10cm high is the same as a box 20cm wide, 60cm long, and 10cm high). 
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To further illustrate, let δS(Si, Se) measure the conceptual distance from system 
state Si, to the desired end-state, Se.  Further, suppose ∀Si, Se ∈ S are characterized by 
〈α1,…, αm〉 ≈ 〈δα1,…, δαm〉.  Thus, the system effectiveness measure, or derived measure, 
could be represented as a combination of the individual system attributes measures as 
follows δS(Si, Se) = f( a1δα1(Siα1, Seα1), a2δα2(Siα2, Seα2), 
…, amδαm(Siαm, Seαm)), where     
∀i, 1 to m, δαi(Siαi, Seαi) is the difference, or conceptual distance, between system state Si 
and the desired end-state, Se, for a specific system attribute αi and ∀i, 1 to m, ai ∈ R+ are 
constants associated with δαi(Siαi, Seαi) indicating relevancy of the attribute.  It follows, 
THEOREM 4:  A derived effectiveness measure, δS(Si, Se), from a 
combination of individual effectiveness measures, δαi(Siαi, Seαi), is a 
semimetric, or pseudo metric. 
 
PROOF:  ∀Si, Sj, Sl, Se ∈ S and ∀δαk ∈ δS, δαk(Siαk, Seαk) ≥ 0 ⇒ δS(Si, Se) ≥ 
0.  Additionally, δαk(Siαk, Sjαk) = 0 ⇔ Siαk = Sjαk.  However, for a derived 
effectiveness measure, δS(Si, Se), the following, ∀Si, Sj ∈ S, δS(Si, Sj) = 0 
⇔ Si = Sj, is not a true statement since ∀Si, Sj ∈ S, ∃Si, Sj ∋ δS(Si, Se) = 
δS(Sj, Se) where Si ≠ Sj.  Continuing, δαk(Siαk, Sjαk) = δαk(Sjαk, Siαk) ⇒ δS(Si, 
Sj) = δS(Sj, Si).  Finally, δαk(Siαk, Sjαk) ≤ δαk(Siαk, Slαk) + δαk(Slαk, Sjαk) ⇒ 
δS(Si, Sj) ≤ δS(Si, Sl) + δS(Sl, Sj).  It follows, (S, δS) is a metric space.  
 
Within the formal system, it has been shown, the derived measure, δS(Si, Se), is a 
pseudo metric (THEOREM 4) that can be measured on a ratio scale (THEOREM 3).  
Although this makes δS(Si, Se) theoretically valid, there is no evidence to show it is 
empirically valid, or that it holds for the Representation Theorem in Measurement Theory 
(Poels, 1996:11).  The limiting factor is the measurement context or defining exactly 
what is to be learned from the act of measurement.  For example, continuing with the 
illustration using the boxes, if the ultimate aim was to compare the volume of the boxes, 
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the scalar representation does have empirical significance.  Thus, empirical validity of the 
scalar system representation comes via definition of the product structure, which is inline 
with the result of THEOREM 1.  Further, the derived effectiveness measure, δS(Si, Se), 
provides a basis as an overall system effectiveness measure. 
Previously, a metric, δ, was defined as a measure of distance that holds for the 
non-negativity, identity, symmetry, and triangle inequality properties.  Clearly, numerous 
measures of distance can be devised to hold for these properties.  For example, for a non-
empty set S, ∀x, y ∈ S, δ(x, y) = 0: if x = y, and δ(x, y) = 1: if x ≠ y is called the discrete 
metric (Apostol, 1974:61).  The most common metrics are derivative of the power, or 








− , where δ is a measure of distance 
between entities x and y each having n attributes and r ∈ R+ is an arbitrarily chosen value 
(Dillon, 1984:124).  To illustrate, with r = 1, ∀x, y ∈ Rn, δ(x, y) = | x1 – y1 | + … + | xn – 
yn | is the rectilinear distance, often called the ‘city-block’ distance (Love, 1988:5).  
However, in a mathematical sense, when discussing metric spaces, one typically is 
addressing Euclidean space, Rn, and the commonly used metric for Rn is the Euclidean 
metric (Suppes, 1989:32). 
To further elaborate, an ordered set of n > 0 real numbers, (x1, x2,…, xn), is called 
an n-dimensional point.  The number xk is called the kth coordinate of point x.  The set of 
all n-dimensional points is called n-dimensional Euclidean space, or n-space, and is 
denoted by Rn (Apostol, 1974:47).  Algebraic operations on n-dimensional points include 
a) equality: x = y ⇔ x1 = y1,…, xn = yn 
b) sum: x + y = (x1 + y1,…, xn + yn) 
c) multiplication by real numbers (scalars): ax = (ax1,…, axn) 
d) difference: x – y = x + (-1)y 
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e) origin or reference vector: 0 = (0,…, 0) 







A final operation on n-dimensional points is called length, or norm.  Although 
there are numerous types of norms (Nash, 1996:618), the Euclidean norm, denoted by     







ii yx , is the most common and is interpreted as the 
Euclidean distance between x and y (Apostol, 1974:48).  Clearly, the Euclidean norm is 
just the power metric with r = 2.  The Euclidean norm, as well as all power metrics, are 
based on four fundamental assumptions: 1) Decomposability – The distance between 
points, driven by system inputs, is a function of the componentwise contributions of those 
inputs, 2) Intradimensional Subtractivity – Each component contribution is the absolute 
value of an appropriate scale difference, 3) Interdimensional Additivity – The distance is 
a function of the sum of componentwise input contributions, and 4) Homogeneity – 
Affine (straight) lines are additive segments (Suppes, 1989:175).  Further, the Euclidean 
norm has the following additional properties (Ruckle, 1991:48): 
a) ∀x ∈ S, || x || = 0 ⇔ x = 0 (identity) 
b) ∀x ∈ S and ∀a ∈ F, the field of scalars, ||ax|| = | a | || x || (scalar homogeneity) 
c) ∀x, y ∈ S, || x + y || ≤ || x || + || y || (triangle inequality) 
For completeness, Rn, as described earlier, is a linear space.  A linear space, or 
vector space, over a field of R+, F, is a set S and two functions; one from S × S → S, 
denoted by +, and one from F × S → S, denoted by ·, which can be characterized by the 
following properties (Ruckle, 1991:31): 
a) ∀x, y, z ∈ S, x + ( y + z ) = ( x + y ) + z (associative for addition) 
b) ∀x, y ∈ S, x + y = y + x (commutative for addition) 
c) ∃ 0 ∈ S ∋ x + 0 = x ∈ S (unique identity) 
d) ∀x ∈ S, ∃ -x ∈ S ∋ x + (-x) = 0 (unique inverse) 
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e) ∀a, b ∈ F and ∀x ∈ S, a( bx ) = ( ab )x (associative for multiplication) 
f) ∀a, b ∈ F and ∀x ∈ S, (a + b ) x = ax + bx (right distributive) 
g) ∀a ∈ F and ∀x, y ∈ S, a( x + y ) = ax + ay (left distributive) 
h) ∀x ∈ S, 1x = x (multiplicative identity) 
Finally, the norm has the following properties on a vector space, or more 
precisely on a normed vector space, Rn (Apostol, 1974:48): 
a) || x || ≥ 0 (non-negativity) and || x || = 0 ⇔ x = 0 (identity) 
b) || ax || = | a | || x || ∀a ∈ R (scalar homogeneity) 
c) || x – y || = || y – x || (symmetry) 
d) | x · y | ≤ || x || || y || (triangle inequality for dot product) 
e) || x + y || ≤ || x || + || y || (triangle inequality for addition) 
Although the Euclidean norm serves as a robust and convenient way to aggregate 
measures, the units of the attributes will not likely be mathematically commensurate, or 
of the same magnitude in their initial form and thus, will require a transformation in order 
to be aggregated.  Comparison of system states relative to an end-state implies individual 
system attributes are aggregated to make an overall statement about the system.  
Aggregation presents a special problem for the proposed effectiveness measurement 
framework, since the measures will likely be in different units and have differing 
magnitudes.  Not addressing this issue of non-commensurate measures will result in a 
systemic error since combination of dissimilar measurements results in certain system 
attributes having a higher proportional weighting relative to other system attributes. 
This aggregation problem is not unique to the proposed framework and is usually 
handled via a normalization transformation before aggregation of the measurements.  In 
general, normalization is a mathematical transformation that maps from one scale to 
another, yielding a common scale.  Numerous normalization techniques exist that will 
make dissimilar measures commensurate for purposes of aggregation.  Some of these 
methods include percentage normalization and summation normalization (Tamiz, 
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1998:572).  The most common techniques, however, attempt to scale each attribute to a 
common scale of zero to one and go by names such as ‘zero-one’ (Tamiz, 1998:573) or 
‘Bowles’ (Zuse, 1998:232) normalization.  For example, the normalization technique 






− , where δ is the value to be scaled 
and δmin and δmax are respectively the minimum and maximum values δ can be assigned 
where δmax - δmin ≠ 0 (Kirkwood, 1997:58).  Another technique often used when δmin and 
δmax are not known, but also produces a result from zero to one, can be calculated as δ’= 
a+2δ
δ , where a ∈ R+ is chosen arbitrarily large relative to δ. 
These normalization techniques are useful in making dissimilar scales 
commensurate for purposes of aggregation.  However, simply applying the 
transformation does not address all the issues.  One issue concerns the meaning (i.e. scale 
type) associated with the numbers before and after the normalization transformation.  
Most normalization techniques result in reduced meaning after the transformation.  
Specifically, ratio meaning is usually lost (Kirkwood, 1997:241; Zuse, 1998:232).  For 
example, let δ1= 17 and δ2= 13 be observations of metrics and thus of ratio scale type.  








δ .  Assume δmin= 10 and δmax= 20.  Thus, δ1’= .7 and δ2’= .3.  Examining 









δ ≠ 1.30, shows the ratio 
scale meaning was lost in the transformation. 
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Another issue involves the meaning of the measurements within a specific 
context.  For example, a decision maker needs to evaluate projects in a portfolio for 
possible termination.  Two projects are found that have exceeded their budgets by 
$1,000,000.  For the cost attribute, each program is a distance of $1,000,000 from their 
respective desired end-states.  However, let one of the programs have an original budget 
of $1,000,000 and the other have original budget of $200,000,000.  Even though in 
general, the two projects are an equal distance from their end-states, from the decision 
maker’s perspective, the interval distance from $1 million to $2 million likely has a 
different meaning from the interval distance from $200 million to $201 million.  Further, 
simply looking at the distance as a percentage of the end-state may not yield equivalent 
distances (Keeney, 1992:115).  It follows, the meaning (i.e. scale type) of numbers is 
context dependent (Kirkwood, 1997:241). 
THEOREM 3 asserted effectiveness measures, as defined within the proposed 
framework, have ratio level meaning.  A fundamental property of a ratio measure, 
building upon the properties of interval measures, is interval distances are equal (Stevens, 
1946:679).  From an applied standpoint, THEOREM 3, suggesting measures have ratio 
scale type in general, and the earlier statement about numerical meaning being context 
dependent, seems to be in conflict.  This suggests, to achieve ratio level meaning, models 
of some system attributes (i.e. measures) may require a scale transformation to convert 
empirical observations such that they yield scales with equal intervals.  For example, 
assume the following scenario: 
A specific system attribute is being monitored.  A measure for the attribute 
has been developed with a lower bound of zero.  Additionally, the desired 
end-state for the attribute has been defined as 10.  Further, for the specific 
context, it is known the following relationship exists: a system attribute 
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value above 10 is twice as desirable as a value below 10.  This implies an 
observed unit interval below 10 is equal to two observed unit intervals 
above 10. 
 
For this scenario, two key issues have to be addressed before the problem of 
normalization for this measure can be solved.  The first issue concerns the unequal unit 
intervals above and below the desired end-state (10).  Since the relationships between the 
intervals are known, this problem can be handled with a scale transformation.  For 
example, let XOBSERVED ∈ R ≥ 0, be the observed system attribute measure (Figure 9).  
Further, let XEQUAL ∈ R ≥ 0, be the equal interval transformation developed using the 
known relationship (Figure 10).  XEQUAL yields empirical observations with ratio level 
meaning.  Clearly, the relationship presented in the scenario will not be known in general 
but will have to be discovered.  This discovery process occurs by asking the decision 
maker, who will be making decisions based off the measurements, or subject matter 
experts on the system of interest, a series of lottery or certainty equivalent questions 
(Luce, 1957:21; Keeney, 1992:6) to identify indifference curves (Keeney, 1992:79; 
Clemen, 1996:540).  This topic of achieving equal intervals is related to the concept of 
differentially value equivalence (Keeney, 1993:94) and is just an extension of the 
substitutability axiom of expected utility (Clemen, 1996:504). 
The second issue concerns the non-monotinicity as a function of the observed 
values.  Non-monotinicity suggests benefits or utility is not an increasing (or decreasing) 
function of observed values (i.e. if more is good, a lot more may not necessarily be 
better).  The above scenario, even after adjusting for equal intervals, is non-monotinic 
since desirability of the system attribute is increasing from 0 to 10 and decreasing from 
10 to ∞+.  However, the benefits or utility is not relative to the scale origin (0), but 
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relative to the end-state (10), or more specifically the distance to the end-state.  Measures 
of distance (i.e. metrics) are always monotonic (Apostol, 1974:60).  This implies, all else 
being equal for the above scenario, a decision maker would be indifferent between 
system attribute values of 5 and 20, on the XOBSERVED scale, since they are the same equal 
interval distance from the desired end-state based on known empirical relationships. 
These examples concerning budget overruns only looked at a single attribute 
(cost).  However, when looking at multiple attributes simultaneously, or in other words, a 
derived effectiveness measure, THEOREM 4 suggested the distance from a system state to 
the desired end-state was not unique to the state (i.e. a semi-metric).  In light of 
THEOREM 4 and the preceding discussion, it follows, strategically equivalent system 
































A desirable characteristic of a normalization transformation is to preserve the 
scale meaning of the input values.  Under the proposed effectiveness measurement 
framework, THEOREM 3 asserted effectiveness measures have ratio scale meaning.  The 
only allowable transformation that preserves ratio level information is multiplication by a 
scalar, x → rx, r ∈ R+.  A logical normalization approach, given the proposed 
framework, which adheres to this transformation, is to normalize the (equal interval) 
distance from the end-state with respect to the end-state (XDESIRED).  Following 
development of a system attribute measure, rules for such a normalization approach are 
outlined in Figure 11.  A detailed example illustrating implementation of the technique on 





Figure 11.  Ratio Preserving Normalization 
This proposed deterministic Theory of Effectiveness Measurement can be 
summarized as follows (Figure 12).  Starting with the system state specification, or 
product structure, the system of interest is identified and, in particular, the system 
boundary is delineated.  Continuing with the specification, the system model is developed 
to include all pertinent dimensions of the system.  This is required, because as asserted in 
THEOREM 1, there is no general notion system effectiveness.  Further, a key aspect 
required for the system model is for all developed measures to hold for the properties of a 
1. Identify the desired end-state
2. Establish certainty equivalent transformation
3. Calculate distance from current system state 
to desired end-state
4. Normalize distance with respect to the end-
state using a ratio preserving transformation















metric (i.e. non-negativity, identity, symmetry, and the triangle inequality).  This step is 
not always straight forward, since meaning (i.e. scale type) is context dependent. 
It follows, an instantiation of all system measures is an observation, or 
measurement, of the system yielding the system state.  A crucial philosophical view, used 
in the theory presented here, is a change from one possible system state to another 
possible system state is an effect.  By representing a system state as an n-dimensional 
vector, corresponding to each of the relevant system attributes (i.e. dimensions), the space 
of these points serves as the space of all possible system consequences.  Clearly, each 
system dimension is a metric space via the definition of the product structure.  However, 
as asserted in THEOREM 4, the space of all possible system states is also a metric space 
from which it follows, system states equidistance from the desired end-state are 
strategically equivalent.  Further, a key result from THEOREM 1 is that the space of all 
possible system states is strongly complete.  Continuing, it follows from THEOREM 2, via 
the triangle inequality, the system state space is transitive.  Combination of the 
transitivity and strongly complete properties yield another property, namely the weak 
order property.  The significance of this derived property is that the state space being a 
metric space along with having weak ordering are sufficient conditions for the system 
state space to be a proximity structure (Suppes, 1989:162). 
The state space being a proximity structure introduces the properties of positivity, 
minimality, and symmetry which are essentially reflections of the metric properties.  
These, along with weak ordering, allow for quaternary relations on the proximity 
structure (i.e. (Si, Sk) ≤S (Sj, Sm)).  Under the proposed framework, however, the 
quaternary relations reduce to ternary relations since each side of the relation has a 
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common parameter (i.e. the desired end-state, Se, yielding (Si, Se) ≤S (Sj, Se)).  Finally, 
THEOREM 3 suggests the state space is of ratio scale type allowing for meaningful 
comparison of inputs yielding system state changes (i.e. δS:(S × Se, ≤S) → (R+, ≤)). 
The deterministic framework provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for conducting effectiveness measurement.  However, by virtue of being ‘deterministic’, 
implied is the assumption of perfect information (i.e. what was seen is what actually 
happened).  Clearly, application of measurement in any domain needs to address error 
and uncertainty, where uncertainty relates to the amount of knowledge available 
concerning a system attribute and error is the deviation of a system attribute measurement 
from the true, but unknown, value (Weise, 1992:1). 
PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK 
Error and uncertainty, as noted earlier, manifests itself in three forms to include 
observational, systemic, and random.  With respect to the proposed effectiveness 
measurement framework, these forms, and their impact, are exemplified in Figure 13.  In 
Figure 13, observational error is illustrated as germane system attributes not being 
identified.  These missing attributes, in turn, do not appear in the system measurement 
model or the system vector representation.  Additionally, random error is shown as an 
interval around a measured value in the system state estimate, x*A.  Further, systemic 
error is portrayed as a shifted, or biased, interval around the observed value.  Finally, 
Figure 13 displays the impact of these errors as an overall, unperceived error between the 
actual and observed system state.  Thus, to address these errors and complement the 
deterministic framework, a probabilistic framework is needed for reasoning about these 

























xA = <  .2, .7,…, .3, .5 >
xA = <  .1, .6,…, .5, .2 >




xA = <  .2, .7,…, .3, .5 >t = T2
xA = <  .2, .5,…, .4, .6 >t = T3
xA = <  .6, .8,…, .8, .9 >t = Tn-1












































Numerous probabilistic reasoning frameworks exist.  These frameworks are 
essentially tools to address uncertainty and error in particular types of problems.  Thus, 
what follows is a brief overview of some probabilistic reasoning techniques to identify a 
preferred approach to support the proposed deterministic effectiveness measurement 
framework. 
In the application of measurement, it is unlikely everything about a domain of 
interest will be known.  Because of this, it is not even possible to precisely quantify what 
is unknown.  To get around this problem, Probability Theory can be used to generalize 
the unknown by assigning a degree of belief, or probability, to what is known (Weise, 
1992:2).  Additionally, domain knowledge consists of known truths about the domain of 
interest (Grassmann, 1996:60).  It should be noted, however, ‘degree of belief’ is not the 
same as ‘degree of truth’ which is the realm of fuzzy logic (Russell, 2003:464).  
Assigning a degree of belief to a measurement implies an underlying distribution 
associated with all possible instantiations of the measure across the universe of discourse 
for the measure (Russell, 2003:469).  The assignment can be based on different 
philosophical views concerning probability including empirical evidence (frequentist), 
proven theoretical assertions (objectivist), or a characterization without physical 
significance (subjectivist) (Russell, 2003:472).  Regardless of how they are derived, these 
assignments form the basis for most probabilistic inference techniques. 
One of these techniques is based on Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST).  DST is 
closely aligned with the frequentist view in that, instead of computing the likelihood of 





































xA = <  x1, x2,…, xn-1, xn >












based on measurements, or evidence, supporting a particular assertion about the domain 
of interest.  This point suggests DST may be a good alternative for developing the 
probabilistic portion of an effectiveness measurement framework.  However, many 
aspects of DST are not well understood and require further research (Russell, 2003:526). 
Another probabilistic reasoning approach is based on Fuzzy Set Theory.  Fuzzy 
Set Theory provides a means for specifying how well a system attribute meets the criteria 
of a given specification (Russell, 2003:526).  A key feature of Fuzzy Set Theory lending 
itself for use in a measurement framework is its ability to handle qualitative, real-world 
observations without the need for precise system attribute quantification.  However, this 
benefit is offset by representation problems of qualitative observations given subjective 
classification criteria (Russell, 2003:527).  Additionally, as noted above, Fuzzy Set 
Theory is based on degrees of truth versus degrees of belief.  From a real-world decision 
making point of view, this can lead to interpretation problems.  For example, in Fuzzy Set 
Theory, the answer to the question, “Are we winning or losing?” is always, “both”. 
One inference framework closely aligned with the above deterministic 
effectiveness measurement framework, is known as filtering.  Filtering uses system state 
representation in the form of vectors and is often used where the internal behavior of a 
system cannot be observed or is not known and must be inferred from the system’s 
external behavior (Maybeck, 1979:4; Welch, 2004:1).  In practice, filtering is the task of 
computing the current state of a system in the face of uncertainty as well as partial and 
noisy measurements (Zarchan, 2005:91).  Mathematically, filtering is a recursive 
estimation technique and takes the form (Russell, 2003:541): 
 P( x̂ k | x*) = f(x*k, P( x̂ k-1 | x*)) ( 8 ) 
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In other words, an estimate of the state of the system at the kth measurement, x̂ k, given all 
measurements of the system, x*, is a function, f, of the latest measurement, xk*, and the 
previous system state estimate, P( x̂ k-1 | x*).  Thus, even if the system of interest is not 
tangible, such as the collective will of a group of people, via filtering we could use 
existing measurements to estimate the current state of the system. 
A popular filter for trying to estimate the state of a system based on uncertain and 
error prone measurements is known as the Kalman filter, first presented by Rudolf E. 
Kalman in 1960 (Kalman, 1960).  The Kalman filter can take ‘noisy’ measurements and 
estimate the state of any system (Maybeck, 1979:4).  A key assumption of the Kalman 
filter is the current system state estimate, x̂ k, is a linear function of the previous state 
estimate, x̂ k-1, plus some Gaussian noise (Maybeck, 1979:7).  This is a reasonable 
assumption under the Central Limit Theorem.  Specifically, as the number of 
measurements increases, the distribution tends to be Gaussian.  Additionally, for the 
likely case of tracking numerous system attributes, the sum of independent random 
variables, regardless of individual density function, tends toward Gaussian as the number 
of random variables gets larger (Maybeck, 1979:8).  In relation to mathematical 
techniques, the Kalman filter is essentially a Bayesian estimator that uses all available 
measurements, and their covariance, to arrive at a system state estimate (Maybeck, 
1979:114). 
Application of the Kalman filter assumes the system of interest can be described 
by a set of differential equations.  Additionally, the equations must be in state-space 
notation.  State-space notation implies any set of linear differential equations can be put 
into the form of the first-order matrix equation: 
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 x̂  = Fx + Gu + w ( 9 ) 
where x is the system state vector, F is the system dynamics matrix, u is a deterministic 
input called a control vector, and w is a random forcing function, which is also known as 
process noise (Zarchan, 2005:33).  It should be noted, G captures the relationships 
between the controls, u, and the system states.  However, since these relationships are 
commonly unknown, many Kalman filtering implementations set G to 0 (Zarchan, 
2005:131). 
In order for the above matrix differential equation to be used as a filter, it must be 
discretized, with measurements taken at a periodicity of Ts.  This is achieved by deriving 
a fundamental matrix, Φ, via the system dynamics matrix, F, using the following 
relationship Φ = L-1 [(sI – F)-1], where L-1 is the inverse Laplace transform and I is the 


















































































 ( 10 ) 
Additionally, Kalman filtering assumes measurements are linearly related to the 
system states via a measurement matrix H along with an associated measurement noise v.  
Finally, constants K, also called Kalman gains, are needed to express the relationship 
between the new measurement and the current estimate.  However, to calculate the gains, 
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the errors in the state estimates before and after the most recent system measurement 
must be taken into account.  This is accomplished using a covariance matrix, Mk, 
representing the error before the measurement and a covariance matrix, Pk, representing 
the error after the measurement in the following set of recursive matrix equations 
(Grewal, 1993:112): 
 Mk = ΦkPk-1ΦkT + Qk 
 Kk = MkHT(HMkHT + Rk)-1 ( 11 ) 
 Pk = (I – KkH)Mk 
It should be noted, Qk and Rk relate to the process noise, w, and the measurement noise, v, 
respectively; specifically, through the following relationships: 
Q = E[wwT] 
  ( 12 ) 
 R = E[vvT] 
Together, the above elements yield the Kalman filter equation (Zarchan, 2005:131): 
 x̂ k = Φk x̂ k-1 + Kk(xk* - HΦk x̂ k-1) ( 13 ) 
A key strength of the Kalman filter is there are no parameters requiring tuning for 
a particular problem.  However, the order of the Kalman filter should fit the order of the 
real-world system, which is typically not known.  The tradeoff is lower order filters are 
better at reducing measurement noise error in an estimate; however, lower order filters 
can also result in significant truncation error, a form of systemic error (Zarchan, 
2005:127).  For example, assume an unknown, system attribute behavior is actually a sine 
wave.  A sine wave will be used since it is a familiar signal, but it also provides a 
challenging, nonlinear behavior to estimate with a Kalman filter.  Additionally, for 
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purposes of illustration, assume there is up to twenty-five percent ‘noise’ in the 

























Figure 15.  1st Order Kalman Filter Estimate of a Sine Wave 
As a first attempt to estimate the unknown system attribute behavior, a 0th order 
filter will be used.  The results are shown in Figure 14.  Clearly, the 0th order filter would 



















is used.  As can be seen in Figure 15, the 1st order filter does better at tracking the 
underlying system behavior, but significantly lags the actual behavior.  As a final attempt 
to estimate the behavior, a 2nd order filter is used.  The results are shown in Figure 16, in 
which the filter estimates the unknown behavior accurately through the first half off the 
sine wave.  In the second half, however, the 2nd order filter tracks the underlying behavior 



















































One approach to dealing with this divergence is called ‘fading memory’ 
(Maybeck, 1982:28).  In the fading memory technique, only the most recent 
measurements are used to estimate the system state.  The impact of this approach using 
an arbitrarily selected 90-period memory is shown in Figure 17.  While Figure 17 shows 
a very close correlation between actual system behavior and the estimate, it should be 
noted, the need for the fading memory technique to address the estimate divergence from 
the actual system behavior, was driven because the actual system behavior was known to 
be a sine wave. 
Since the true states of a system will not likely be available to validate a filter, a 
conservative approach is to use a second-order filter which is equivalent of keeping track 
of the position, velocity, and acceleration of system attribute movements.  Thus, the 




















































































































































&  ( 14 ) 
An intuitive feature of the Kalman filter is errors in the estimates decrease as the 
number of measurements taken increases (Zarchan, 2005:148).  It follows from this 
result, process noise can be assumed to be zero as more measurements are taken, which 
simplifies and allows for off-line calculation of the Kalman gains, K (Zarchan, 
2005:156).  A detailed example illustrating use of the second-order Kalman filter appears 
in Appendix C. 
Finally, it should be emphasized, the above linear filter will be used to estimate 
the state of what is likely a non-linear, real world system.  However, even if a model of 
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the non-linear system was available, the above, basic linear filter is very robust and 
performs just as well as various non-linear Kalman filter variants, especially when the 
true underlying nature of the system is unknown (Zarchan, 2005:291, 329).  Regardless, 
real-world non-linearity does reduce system state estimate accuracy as illustrated in 
Figure 16.  This problem can best be addressed by increasing the periodicity, Ts, at which 
measurements are taken (Zarchan, 2005:291, 677).  In other words, the more 
measurements one takes, the more accurate the estimate.  For example, Figure 18 
displays the result of estimating the sine wave based on the same measurements shown in 
















Figure 18.  Impact of Increased Sample Rate on Sine Wave Estimate 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FRAMEWORKS 
The motivating driver for this research was to meet the needs of the practitioner, 
tasked with measuring progress towards abstract objectives, with the proper theory.  
While the above deterministic and probabilistic frameworks provide the proper theory, to 










section is to demonstrate the practical nature of the frameworks by implementing them on 
a simple, but realistic scenario. 
A number of approaches are available to highlight the usefulness of the proposed 
theory.  One of the alternatives explored included implementing the frameworks in a 
generic scenario using a simple, toy model developed using system dynamics or causal 
analysis techniques.  While the simplicity would have provided transparency, the generic 
nature of the approach did not provide a level of realism likely required to which a 
practitioner could relate. 
Another alternative examined was to use data collected on a historical battle.  
Numerous data sets exist such as those used in proving the theoretical assertions 
contained in The War Trap (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981).  Unfortunately, most available 
datasets, as in The War Trap, only provide visibility on the starting state and the end-
state, with no insight on events traversed between the two states.  However, a few 
datasets do contain this level of fidelity.  Highly detailed and comprehensive datasets on 
the World War II Battles of Kursk and Ardennes are available from the United States 
National Technical Information Service.  While these datasets do provide time series data 
between the starting state and the end-state for individual units, the datasets are attrition 
oriented detailing only the unit location and strength level for each day of the respective 
battles.  There is no insight into the cause for certain movements or declines in force 
strength. 
A final alternative investigated, and ultimately used, for illustrating use of the 
frameworks, was to employ a high fidelity model depicting a realistic scenario.  
Numerous high fidelity models exist for the purposes of analysis and wargamming.  
 
 95
However, many of these models, such as the THUNDER campaign level warfare model 
and the Combat Forces Assessment Model (CFAM), are attrition oriented which is not in 
alignment with the tenets of EBO.  One model though, specifically developed to support 
the concepts behind EBO is called Point of Attack 2 (POA2). 
POA2 is a comprehensive and detailed, modern, tactical level, combat simulator 
that depicts engagements at the platoon and individual vehicle level, along with complete 
characterization of supporting artillery, air strikes, electronic warfare, engineering, 
chemical warfare, helicopter, naval, and psychological operations units (HPS, 2006).  
POA2 was designed to model the capabilities and effects of conventional weapons as 
well as developing technologies.  POA2 was developed by HPS Simulations via funding 
from the Plasma Physics Program of the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research.  The 
focus of the development effort was to create a state-of-the-art strategy wargame 
specifically designed to capture the effects of non-traditional weapons such as a high 
powered microwave (AFOSR, 2001). 
While using an effects oriented model, such as POA2, was a necessary condition 
for demonstrating the theory, another critical factor was the scenario to be portrayed.  Of 
key importance was finding a scenario that would highlight the strengths and limitations 
of the proposed theory.  An additional characteristic was finding a scenario that would 
resonate with the practitioner.  POA2 comes with several preprogrammed scenarios.  One 
of these scenarios was selected and modified, as illustrated in what follows, for the 
purposes of demonstrating the frameworks.  The scenario, involving a terrorist attack on 
a Continental United States Air Force Base, is highlighted here: 
Extremist attempt to breach a southwestern United States airfield with 
truck bombs and car bombs in an effort to destroy aircraft near a runway 
 
 96
as well as blowup a fuel depot.  Additionally, using the truck/car bomb 
explosions as cover, extremist squads in off-road vehicles, try to infiltrate 
laboratories developing critical, near ready to be fielded technologies to 
support the Global War on Terror, in an effort to steal the technologies, 
destroy the laboratories supporting the technologies, and kill the people 
creating them.  Base security forces, unaware of the impending attack, 
respond. 
 
The base security forces (BLUE forces) are composed of the following objects, 




















Figure 19.  Scenario Details 
    1 x Command Post 
  10 x Armored Vehicle (HMMWV 988A2) 
  30 x Military Police (R) 
    4 x Parked Bomber (B-1) 
    6 x Parked Fighter (F-16) 
    1 x Fuel Depot (Large Masonry Building) 
    3 x Laboratory (Large Masonry Building) 
195 x Civilian 
 
Similarly, using existing objects as defined in the POA2 software, the extremist 








































◙ Truck/Car Bomber 
Terrorist Squad
+  Civilian Workers 
◊ Jet Fighter
◘ Jet Bomber
×  Security Forces
Fuel Depot





    2 x Truck Bomber 
    3 x Car Bomber 
    3 x Off-road Vehicle (CUCV 4 x 4) 
    9 x Terrorist (Infantry (R)) 
Details of the scenario are illustrated in Figure 19.  Specifically, the fighters (◊) 
and the bombers (◘) are parked in the open, but are guarded by military police in armored 
vehicles (×).  Additionally, military police in armored vehicles (×) are positioned near the 
major base entry gates.  These gates are the entry points for the truck and car bombers 
(◙).  While the fighters (◊) and the bombers (◘) are key targets for the truck and car 
bombers (◙), destruction of the fuel depot (□) is another target of the extremists.  The 
paths to be traversed by the truck and car bombers (◙) to the fighters (◊), bombers (◘), 
and the fuel depot (□) are indicated by the arrows (→).  The base security forces are 
controlled centrally through the command post (*), which can result in delays in the 
receipt and distribution of intelligence information as well as delays in the transmission 
of updated orders.  While the extremists would consider completed attacks on the fighters 
(◊), bombers (◘), and the fuel depot (□) a victory, their true intent is to obtain advanced 
technologies being developed in laboratories (■) on the base.  Terrorists in off-road 
vehicles (○) will traverse the paths indicated by the arrows (→) across the base to the 
laboratories (■) to obtain the technologies and if successful, use the same paths (→) to 
egress.  The side of the base with the laboratories is also patrolled by military police in 
armored vehicles (×).  Finally, scattered throughout the base are government civilian 
workers (+) that are potentially in harms way. 
As noted, the base security forces are unaware of the impending attack.  Despite 
being in the position of responding as events unfold, the base security forces can develop 
a desired end-state to focus actions.  The end-state would be a function of what is valued 
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as explained under the deterministic framework.  For this scenario, the base security 
forces’ notional desired end-state is illustrated in Figure 20.  Specifically, the three 
primary objectives in the notional end-state are to secure the base, remain fully mission 
capable, and secure advanced technologies.  Additionally, the ‘secure the base’ objective 
can be further broken down into the sub-objectives: all base sectors searched, all 
units/individuals identified, and all discovered terrorists captured/killed.  In a similar 
manner, the ‘remain fully mission capable’ objective is composed of the sub-objectives: 
no personnel losses (both military and civilian), no equipment losses, and no 
infrastructure losses.  Finally, the ‘secure advanced technologies’ objective, is made up of 
the sub-objectives: all base sectors searched for technologies and all stolen technologies 
recovered/destroyed.  To complete the end-state characterization requires quantifying 
priorities among the objectives.  This is done by assigning weights to the objectives.  For 






























































As noted under the deterministic framework, a key aspect of the proposed 
methodology is being able to quantify abstract concepts.  This is accomplished by 
identifying what is important and continuing to ask ‘why it is important’ until the concept 
cannot be further refined.  This reductionist approach assisted in yielding the end-state 
characterization shown in Figure 20.  However, in addition to breaking down abstract 
concepts, this methodology also simplifies the task of identifying attributes and their 
measures.  Refinement of concepts to this fundamental level often yields natural and 
direct measures (Sink, 1985:86).  This outcome can be seen in Table 5.  Finally, on an 
Intel® Pentium 4® 3GHz based computer with 1GB of RAM, the scenario requires 
approximately 2½ hours to reach completion, which occurs when either RED escapes or 
is captured/killed.  The significant scenario events occurring over the twenty-five minutes 
of simulated time are outlined in Table 6.  The resulting twenty-five minutes generated 
the observations, at one minute intervals, shown in Table 7. 
Table 5.  Attributes and Measures Characterizing BLUE End-State 
Objective Value Attribute Measure
All base sectors 





Number of individuals/units positively identified.  The total number 
changes as the scenario progresses, but begins with the total 
military and civilian base population (30 + 195).
All discovered terrorists 
captured/killed Terrorists captured/killed
Number of positively identified terrorists captured/killed.  The total 
number changes as the scenario progresses but begins at 0.  
Note: For this scenario, the number could be as high as 14 (9 
terrorists + 3 car bombers + 2 truck bombers).
Military losses Number of military losses out of a potential total of 30.
Civilian losses Number of civilian losses out of a potential total of 195.
Aircraft losses Number of aircraft losses out of a potential total of 10 (4 bombers + 4 fighters).
Security vehicle losses Number of security vehicles losses out of a potential total of 10.
No infrastructure losses Infrastructure losses Number of infrastructure losses out of a potential total of 5 (3 laboratories + 1 fuel depot + 1 command post).
All base sectors 
searched for 
technologies
Sectors searched Number of sectors searched out of 11 total.




Number of technologies recovered/destroyed.  The number 












Table 7 represents the raw observations for each of the system attributes of 
interest.  However, an inescapable feature of measurement is error and uncertainty 
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(Mitchell, 2003:301; Finkelstein, 2003:45).  If the constraints of normality and linearity 
across errors are assumed, when combined with domain knowledge, a Kalman filter can 
be used to mitigate the impact of this error and uncertainty.  The raw observations in 
Table 7 transformed through use of a 2nd order Kalman filter (Ts = 1), along with domain 
knowledge about the environment, are shown in Table 8. 
One of the underlying themes of this research is that effectiveness is a relative 
concept.  Thus, in order to measure effectiveness, a reference point is required.  Under 
the framework being presented, the reference point is associated with the desired-end 
state.  The reference point for each of the attributes of interest in this scenario is shown 
along with the filtered observations in Table 9. 
Table 6.  Scenario Significant Events 
Time Period Significant Events
1 - Terrorists commence with attack plan
- Base security forces encounter terrorists
- Base security forces begin search for terrorists
- Base security forces start friend/foe identification
- Base security forces kill a truck bomber
- Base security forces kill a car bomber
9 - Base security forces kill a car bomber
10 - Base security forces kill a truck bomber
11 - Base security forces kill a car bomber
12 - Base security forces first encounter terrorist squads in off-road vehicles
13 - Base security forces kill 1 terrorist squad in an off-road vehicle
- Base security forces sustain first losses
- Terrorists steal critical technology from a laboratory
- One base security vehicle destroyed by terrorists
- Base security forces kill 1 terrorist squad in an off-road vehicle
- Base security forces complete search of all sectors for terrorists
- All friendly forces accounted for
- Terrorists destroy 1 laboratory
- First civilian losses
19 - Base security forces complete search for critical technlogies
24 - Base security forces recover stolen critical technology







Continuing, this research generically defined effectiveness as an attribute distance 
change relative to the desired end-state for the attribute.  These distances are shown in 
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Table 10.  While these distances allow for comparison across time periods for a given 
system attribute, more meaningful insight on progress towards the desired end-state is 
provided by comparing across system attributes.  To obtain this type of insight requires 
normalizing the attribute observations.  Although numerous normalization techniques 
exist, many do not preserve the scale meaning of the original observation (Kirkwood, 
1997:241; Zuse, 1998:232).  One technique that does preserve the scale meaning of the 
original observations is outlined in Figure 11.  The algorithm in Figure 11 was used to 
transform the distances in Table 10 to the normalized distances shown in Table 11.  
Finally, the normalized distances can be combined to provide a single system 
effectiveness measure by multiplying the normalized attribute distances by the associated 
attribute weighting (Figure 20), which yields the results in Table 12. 
These steps complete implementation of the frameworks developed in this 
research.  However, display of the resulting information is also important.  Although not 
a focus of this research effort, visualization of quantitative data is crucial in supporting 
decision-making based on effectiveness measures (Tufte, 1997:9).  For the scenario 
results, three possible alternatives to visualize the data in Table 12 are shown in Figure 
21, Figure 22, and the twenty-five figures of Appendix D. 
These types of visualization techniques more clearly and readily communicate 
important system changes to the decision maker.  For example, the bar charts in 
Appendix D provide time independent views of the system (scenario) at one minute 
intervals for the duration of the scenario.  The charts not only highlight the significant 
events as delineated in Table 6, but more importantly portray the effect of those events 
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relative to the desired end-state.  Further, because of the mathematical concepts built into 
the proposed theory, the magnitude of the effect, or the effectiveness, can be assessed. 
When the information contained in the bar charts is consolidated into a single 
view, additional insights can be gleaned as illustrated in Figure 21.  The consolidation 
removes the time independence constraint and provides the decision maker a historical 
perspective on the effect and effectiveness of system (scenario) events over time.  
Further, Figure 21 not only indicates how individual system attributes are changing over 
time, but the last row in Figure 21 incorporates the attribute priorities, identified in Figure 
20, to provide an overall system effectiveness assessment. 
Another approach to viewing the information in Figure 21 is shown in Figure 22.  
The line chart view of Figure 22 also shows the overall system effectiveness assessment, 
but instead of going down to the attribute level, Figure 22 portrays the data only down to 
the primary objective level.  Collectively, these three alternative views illustrate how the 
decision maker can control the granularity of the effectiveness measurements to best 
support decision making. 
The overall effectiveness measurement process used for this notional scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 23.  Comparing Figure 23 to Figure 1 highlights how the elements 
developed in this research build upon the established, basic measurement concepts.  The 
overall process starts with the product structure, or measurement model, presented earlier.  
Embedded within the product structure process is the development of measures.  If the 





Table 7.  Scenario Observations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 




0    
–    
0  
0    
–    
0
0    
–    
0   
0    
–    
0
3    
– 
107
3    
– 
107
4    
– 
107
4    
– 
108
5    
– 
128
5    
– 
149
6    
– 
149
7    
– 
168
8    
– 
181
9    
– 
200
10   
– 
219
11   
– 
219
12   
– 
227
12   
– 
227
13   
– 
227
13   
– 
227
13   
– 
227
13   
– 
227
13   
– 
227
13   
– 
227




Captured / Killed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 5 8 8 8 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 13 14
Military Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Civilian Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Aircraft Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security Vehicle 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sectors Searched 











Table 8.  Kalman Filtered Observations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 
















3    
–  
95
3    
– 
122
4    
– 
127
5    
– 
126
5    
– 
134
5    
– 
149
6    
– 
155
7    
– 
166
8    
– 
178
9    
– 
193
10   
– 
210
11   
– 
220
12   
– 
225
13   
– 
225
13   
– 
225
14   
– 
225
14   
– 
225
14   
– 
225
14   
– 
225
14   
– 
225




Captured / Killed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 9 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 14
Military Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Civilian Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 14 19 21 23 25 26 26 26
Aircraft Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security Vehicle 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sectors Searched 











Table 9.  Filtered Observations with Reference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 
for Terrorists
0   
–   
0
0   
–   
0
0   
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0
0   
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0
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11
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11
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7   
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–  
11




































Individuals / Units 
Identified
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0
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0
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0
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0
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13  
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13  
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13  
–   
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–   
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14
Military Losses
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Table 10.  Distance from End-State 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 
for Terrorists 0 0 0 0 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Individuals / Units 
Identified 0 0 0 0 130 103 98 99 91 76 70 59 47 32 15 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Terrorists 
Captured / Killed 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Military Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Civilian Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 14 19 21 23 25 26 26 26
Aircraft Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security Vehicle 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sectors Searched 











Table 11.  Normalized Distance from End-State 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 
for Terrorists 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.46 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Individuals / Units 
Identified 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Terrorists 
Captured / Killed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
Military Losses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Civilian Losses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Aircraft Losses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Security Vehicle 
Losses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Infrastructure 
Losses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Sectors Searched 























7.5% Individuals / Units Identified
15.0% Terrorists Captured / Killed
50% 10.0% Military Losses
50% 10.0% Civilian Losses
80% 8.0% Aircraft Losses























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.022 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.120 0.060 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.048 0.034 0.027 0.020 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000






for Terrorists 100% 100% 100% 100% 32% 42% 43% 42% 47% 54% 57% 63% 70% 79% 88% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Individuals / Units 
Identified 100% 100% 100% 100% 43% 55% 57% 57% 61% 67% 70% 75% 80% 86% 94% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Terrorists 
Captured / Killed 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 20% 60% 80% 83% 86% 100% 100% 90% 100% 100% 92% 100% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 100%
No Military 
Losses 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 93% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
No Civilian 
Losses 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 93% 90% 89% 88% 87% 87% 87% 87%
No Aircraft 
Losses 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
No Security 
Vehicle Losses 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
No Infrastructure 
Losses 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Sectors Searched 




100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 76% 77% 78% 80% 87% 91% 92% 87% 91% 94% 72% 74% 76% 72% 73% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 95%
61% - 94%25% - 60%0% - 25%
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◙ Truck/Car Bomber 
Terrorist Squad
+  Civilian Workers 
◊ Jet Fighter
◘ Jet Bomber
×  Security Forces
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Objective Value Attribute Measure
All base sectors 
searched for terrorists





Number of individuals/units positively identified.  The total 
number changes as the scenario progresses, but begins with 
the total military and civilian base population (30 + 195).




Number of positively identified terrorists captured/killed.  The 
total number changes as the scenario progresses but begins at 
0.  Note: For this scenario, the number could be as high as 14 
(9 terrorists + 3 car bombers + 2 truck bombers).
Military losses Number of military losses out of a potential total of 30.
Civilian losses Number of civilian losses out of a potential total of 195.
Aircraft losses Number of aircraft losses out of a potential total of 10 (4 
bombers + 4 fighters).
Security vehicle losses Number of security vehicles losses out of a potential total of 10.
No infrastructure losses Infrastructure losses Number of infrastructure losses out of a potential total of 5 (3 
laboratories + 1 fuel depot + 1 command post).
All base sectors 
searched for 
technologies
Sectors searched Number of sectors searched out of 11 total.




Number of technologies recovered/destroyed.  The number 
changes as the scenario progresses but starts at 0 and can be 
as high as 3.
No personnel losses
No equipment losses







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sectors Searched 




0    
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0  
0    
–    
0
0    
–    
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0    
–    
0
3    
– 
107
3    
– 
107
4    
– 
106
4    
– 
108
5    
– 
128
5    
– 
149
6    
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149
7    
– 
168
8    
– 
181
9    
– 
200
10   
– 
219
11   
– 
218
12   
– 
227
12   
– 
227
13   
– 
226
13   
– 
226
13   
– 
226
13   
– 
226
13   
– 
226
13   
– 
226




Captured / Killed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 5 8 8 8 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 13 14
Military Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Civilian Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Aircraft Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security Vehicle 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sectors Searched 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Time PeriodsAttributes
1. Identify the desired end-state
2. Establish certainty equivalent transformation
3. Calculate distance from current system state 
to desired end-state
4. Normalize distance with respect to the end-
state using a ratio preserving transformation













Measure Aggregation (e.g. Normalization)







x̂ = Fx + Gu + w
Φ = L-1 [(sI – F)-1]
Mk = ΦkPk-1ΦkT + Qk
Kk = MkHT(HMkHT + Rk)-1
Pk = (I – KkH)Mk
Q = E[wwT]
R = E[vvT]
x̂ k = Φk x̂k-1 + Kk(xk* - HΦk x̂ k-1)
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presented in this research also hold.  Additionally, after conducting system observations, 
mathematical techniques, such as that in Figure 11, can be used to assist in aggregation of 
low level data.  Further, probabilistic reasoning techniques, like the Kalman Filter 
presented in this research, can be used to address the error and uncertainty associated 
with effectiveness measurement.  As displayed in Figure 23, the collective measurements 
can then be used to provide insights about the system of interest and specifically, how the 
system is progressing towards the desired end-state. 
To stress a final point, in the scenario used to demonstrate the frameworks 
proposed in this research, a single course-of-action was used.  Specifically, pre-
positioned base security forces patrolled pre-defined areas of responsibility until terrorists 
were encountered.  After encountering terrorists, the base security forces engaged the 
terrorists and pursued them even if pursuit took the base security forces beyond their pre-
defined area of responsibility.  An additional element of the course-of-action was to 
maximize base security force coverage of the entire base (highlighted area in Figure 19).  
This resulted in some base security forces leaving their pre-defined area of responsibility 
to provide support even if terrorists were not encountered.  This course-of-action used is 
notional and is clearly one of many that could have been used to respond to the terrorist 
attack. 
The proposed frameworks as presented were intended for use in assessing the 
effectiveness of a single course-of-action that was being executed.  A natural extension in 
the use of the frameworks, however, is to determine which course-of-action to use among 
a number of developed courses-of-action.  The proposed frameworks provide a 
foundation for developing a common basis for comparison on not only course-of-action 
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fulfillment of the desired end-state but on timeliness of fulfillment as well.  To further 
assist in development of courses-of-action for achievement of a desired end-state, the 
proposed frameworks could be combined with various Operations Research techniques 
such as Response Surface Methodology, to identify common strengths and weaknesses 
among courses-of-action being evaluated, or Linear/Goal Programming, to optimize 
timing and sequencing of action within a selected course-of-action. 
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THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation has synthesized elements from the broad field of measurement, 
reviewed and identified limitations of various measurement approaches, and introduced a 
theoretical foundation, as well as a corresponding framework for effectiveness 
measurement.  While the primary motivation for this research was measurement of 
military campaign advancement, effectiveness measurement is of broad interest and 
applicable to many fields of endeavor.  The methods developed in this research address 
the need for a rigorous, mathematically grounded basis for monitoring progress towards 
abstract goals and objectives. 
This research began by exploring fundamental issues related to measurement as 
well as foundational concepts established via Measurement Theory.  These theoretical 
topics were then balanced by an examination of various views on the application of 
measurement.  Next, attention focused on the key driver of this research, Effects-based 
Operations.  Despite the literature in the field of Effects-based Operations being highly 
disjoint, commonalities were identified to establish a foundation for effects concepts.  
Finally, building upon the measurement, Measurement Theory, and Effects-based 
Operations ideas, Measure Theory concepts were introduced, which provided the 
mathematical means for real-world system modeling.  Culmination of these concepts 
resulted in an axiomatic-based Theory of Effectiveness Measurement. 
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To meet the practical needs of measurement application, a probabilistic 
framework to address error and uncertainty associated with effectiveness measurement 
was also introduced.  Numerous techniques exist for probabilistic reasoning.  While each 
technique has advantages and disadvantages, all are suitable to handle the error and 
uncertainty encountered in effectiveness measurement.  However, one established 
approach, Kalman Filtering, stood out as being best suited for mitigating these 
probabilistic problems, as well as being an excellent match for integration with the 
axiomatic-based Theory of Effectiveness Measurement developed in this research.  As a 
final means of making this introduced mathematical construct pragmatic, mechanical 
details on the implementation of the Theory of Effectiveness Measurement were 
demonstrated using a notional scenario. 
While this research introduced a new, comprehensive theory, there are a number 
of areas for further research.  First, this research assumed a course-of-action had been 
developed and was being executed.  The developed effectiveness measurement 
framework then provides feedback to determine the effectiveness of the course-of-action.  
A key step of an effects-based approach, however, is planning, or determining the best 
course-of-action from a number of developed courses-of-action (USJFC, 2006:viii).  
During planning, the developed effectiveness measurement framework could provide a 
common basis for comparison of candidate courses-of-action.  In a similar vein, during 
the planning process, the developed effectiveness measurement framework could be 
combined with Operations Research techniques such as Linear and Goal Programming to 
optimize the sequencing and timing of a selected best course-of-action. 
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Another assumption of this research is that observations are based strictly on 
outward behavioral system attributes.  This passive approach will always have more error 
and uncertainty associated with it since the time between the observed behavior and the 
action that produced the observed behavior will rarely be instantaneous.  If the 
effectiveness measurement framework developed in this research could be linked with 
internal models of the system of interest, not only could the error and uncertainty be 
significantly mitigated, but system state changes from a given action could be forecasted. 
The goal of this research was to provide a framework for effectiveness 
measurement from both a theoretical and practical view.  An axiomatic-based 
measurement theory was presented and a generic measurement methodology explored.  
The most important contribution of this effort is a theory for effectiveness measurement; 
however, there are empirical benefits as well.  The intent was to develop fundamental 
effectiveness measurement principles and to give theoretical, as well as practical 
guidelines for implementation of effectiveness measurement. 
The theory provides a standardized framework for thinking about effects 
regardless of the domain.  The framework includes precise definitions of the qualitative 
concepts within the frameworks, along with their corresponding quantitative notation.  
Additionally, there is a mechanism for interpreting numbers, criteria for selecting 
measures, conditions for comparing measures, theoretical foundations for validating 
measures, as well as approaches for handling uncertainty. 
From an academic standpoint, the most significant contribution is the ‘theory’, 
however, from a practical standpoint, the most important contribution, is meeting the 
needs of the practicing analyst with the proper theory.  In summary, a theoretically-based 
 
 117
effectiveness measurement approach provides effects assessment practitioners a level of 




THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
APPENDIX A: GAME THEORY 
 
Game Theory addresses decision contexts where there are two or more decision 
makers with competing or conflicting objectives and the outcome for each decision 
maker depends on the choices made by the others (Winston, 1994:824).  Additionally, 
each decision maker knows their outcome is influenced by the choices of other decision 
makers which in turn, influences their preferences.  Essentially, Game Theory assists a 
decision maker in arriving at a better decision.  In Game Theory, the decision depends on 
the choices available to the decision maker and the decision maker’s preferences on the 
outcomes of each of those alternatives.  Additionally, the decision maker’s beliefs about 
what actions are available to each of the other decision makers, beliefs about how each of 
those decision makers rank the outcomes of their choices, and beliefs about every other 
decision maker’s beliefs (Luce, 1957:5) also influence the decision at hand. 
Game Theory provides a framework for thinking about strategic interaction and 
helps formulate an optimal strategy by forecasting the outcome of strategic situations 
(Dresher, 1961:1).  Thus, Game Theory concerns games of strategy versus games of pure 
chance such as slot machines or non-interactive games like solitaire.  The idea of a 
general theory of games was introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 
1944, in their book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.  They describe a game as 
a competitive situation among two or more decision makers, or groups with a common 
objective, conducted under a prescribed set of rules and known outcomes (von Neumann, 
1944:49).  The objective of Game Theory is to determine the best strategy for a given 
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decision maker under the assumption the other decision makers are rational, or 
consistently make decisions in alignment with some well-defined objective, and will 
make intelligent countermoves, where intelligent implies all decision makers have the 
same information and are capable of inferring the same insights from that information 
(von Neumann, 1944:51). 
A cornerstone concept of Game Theory is each decision maker will act to 
maximize their expected outcome.  For example, possible outcomes are generally 
characterized by a numeric representation or on a utility scale.  It is assumed, given a set 
of possible choices and associated outcomes, for any two alternatives, decision makers 
can discern preference or indifference among the alternatives, allowing them to rank the 
set of alternatives with respect to each other.  A key result from von Neumann and 
Morgenstern is there exists a way of assigning utility numbers to the outcomes such that 
the decision maker would always choose the option that maximizes their expected utility 
(Luce, 1957:4).  Thus, while Decision Theory assumes decision makers are self-
interested and selfish, Game Theory extends this to assume everyone else is too. 
Games can be characterized in a wide variety of ways.  Some of the attributes that 
can be used to classify games include players, structure, outcome, interaction, timing, and 
information.  Game Theory typically addresses contexts with n-decision makers, where n 
is two or more.  However, some sources address 1-person games as games against 
‘nature’, which is the realm of Decision Theory. 
Games can be characterized by three basic structures: Simultaneous, Sequential, 
and Repeated.  In Simultaneous games (also known as Static or Stage games), all 
decision makers reveal their decision to other decision makers simultaneously (Myerson, 
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1991:47).  Thus, Simultaneous games amount to trying to forecast the decisions of other 
decision makers.  Even in situations where decisions are not made simultaneously, any 
game where decisions are made without knowledge of other decision maker’s choices are 
considered Simultaneous games. 
Sequential games (also known as Dynamic or Multi-stage games) require a 
sequence of decisions for preferences over a set of alternatives where a different set of 
alternatives is presented at each decision point; usually dependent on decisions made in 
previous stages.  Thus, ordering of decisions is important.  Finally, Repeated games, like 
sequential games, require a sequence of decisions, but each decision point is similar to a 
simultaneous game where choices available and their outcomes may be dependent on 
previous choices.  In contrast to a ‘one-shot’ Simultaneous game, in Repeated games, all 
past decisions for previous decision points are known to all other decision makers 
(Fudenberg, 1993:107). 
Another attribute of games concerns outcome.  A constant-sum game is where the 
sum of the outcomes for all decision makers is constant (Winston, 1994:827).  A common 
instantiation is where the constant is zero.  Thus, a zero-sum game is one where the 
decision makers’ interests are in direct conflict and what one decision maker ‘loses’, 
another decision maker ‘wins’.  A constant-sum game is in contrast to a variable sum 
game, or general-sum game, where the sum of the outcomes for all decision makers is not 
constant (Owen, 1968:136). 
Interaction is another way to categorize games.  Interaction addresses the level of 
cooperation among decision makers.  In a non-cooperative game, each decision maker 
pursues their own interests (Luce, 1957:89).  In cooperative games, however, decision 
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makers are free to form coalitions and make agreements, essentially combining their 
decision making problems (Myerson, 1991:244). 
Table 13.  Attributes of Games 
 
Yet another way to classify Game Theory problems is by time.  In general, Game 
Theory does not put a time constraint on the decision maker to make a decision at a 
decision point.  However, if the passage of time does impact the expected outcome, the 
game is referred to as a Duel (Dresher, 1961:128).  Another type of game where time is a 
factor is a differential game.  Differential games address multi-decision maker problems 
in dynamic situations where the position, or state, of the players develops continuously in 
time (Friedman, 1971:19). 
A final way to characterize games is by information.  A game of perfect 
information is one where each decision maker has the same information.  This includes 
information on all previous decisions for sequential games (Shubik, 1982:232).  If the 
game does not allow for perfect information, it is termed a game of imperfect information 
or a Bayesian game (Fudenberg, 1993:209).  Finally, in a game of incomplete 
Attribute Game Type 
Players 1-player n-players 
Structure 
Simultaneous (Static or One-stage) 
Sequential (Dynamic or Multi-stage) 
Repeated 
Outcome Constant-sum Variable-sum 











information, only some elements of information are unknown.  Table 13 summarizes 
these various game attributes. 
0
1 2 3
2 1 3 2
 
Figure 24.  Extensive Form (Game Tree) 
Regardless of game type, a conceptual model is needed in order to analyze a 
game.  There are three primary models, or forms, that can be used: extensive form, 
coalitional form, and strategic form.  Games in extensive form are usually depicted as a 
multi-player decision tree (Luce, 1957:40) as shown in Figure 24.  The extensive form 
describes sequentially what each decision maker might do and the possible outcomes.  
For example, in Figure 24, the number at each node represents the player making the 
decision.  By convention, node ‘0’ is a chance node.  In the literature, the lesser discussed 
of the three forms is the coalitional form, which is focused on examining the value of 
belonging to a coalition (Shubik, 1983:4). 
Games in strategic form, or normal form, are the most common for examining 
games.  In strategic form, in contrast to the extensive form, details of the game, such as 
position and move, are not shown.  The key aspects available in the strategic form are the 
decision makers, their strategies, and the possible outcomes (Luce, 1957:53).  All the 
forms generally assume the number of decision makers is finite.  Additionally, all the 
forms usually assume the number of strategies available to each decision maker is also 
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finite.  However, extensions with the strategic form can accommodate a decision maker 
with infinite strategies (Fudenberg, 1993:5).  Mathematically, the simplest way to 
describe a game is the strategic form.  Thus, the strategic form will be the focus in the 
remainder of this review. 
A specific strategic form game can be formalized by three elements: the set of 
decision makers or players i ∈ I, which is assumed to be finite (i.e. I = { 1, 2,…, n }); the 
set of alternatives available to each of the decision makers, or the pure strategy space Si = 
{ si1,…, sim } m < ∞; and the outcome functions ui : Si → R giving player i’s von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui(s) where s = ( s1w, s2x,…, siy,…, snz ) is the strategy 
profile, or specific instance of choices made by all decision makers (Fudenberg, 1993:4). 
Many n-person decision contexts with competing decision makers have multiple, 
conflicting objectives.  Typically, however, the objectives will have a common ordering 
among all the decision makers which has the effect of polarizing the decision context and 
essentially making it a 2-person game (Isaacs, 1965:306).  Examples of this phenomenon 
are numerous.  A historical example is the unlikely alliance of the USA, Soviet Union, 
and China during World War II.  Although these ‘players’ had fundamental differences at 
the time, an important, shared objective brought them together, polarizing the situation.  
Additionally, simplifying an n-person (n > 2) game to a 2-peron game, allows a 
characterization of the strategic form to be displayed as ‘game matrix’ (Fudenberg, 
1993:5). 
The following Gridiron game (Table 14) is used to demonstrate additional 
properties of games.  The Gridiron game is a non-cooperative, 2-person, simultaneous, 
zero-sum, non-duel game with perfect information.  The two players are Offense and 
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Defense.  Offense has four alternatives, or pure strategies, to choose from and Defense 
has three.  A pure strategy is a predetermined sequence of moves and countermoves made 
during the game (Kaplan, 1982:105).  In this game, Offense knows its pure strategies, the 
pure strategies of Defense, and the outcome when one pure strategy is played against 
another.  Defense has the same information.  When all players know the same fact, it is 
called mutual knowledge.  Further, Offense knows Defense knows what it knows and 
Defense knows Offense knows what it knows.  When all players know a fact and all 
know that all know it, it is called common knowledge (Fudenberg, 1993:541). 
Table 14.  Gridiron Game 
  
If some pure strategy is strictly preferred over another strategy s, regardless of 
what other players do, s is a dominating strategy (Luce, 1957:79).  For Offense, ‘Medium 
Pass’ is always preferred over ‘Short Pass’.  Thus, ‘Short Pass’ is dominated.  If there 
were a strategy, s, that dominated all other strategies regardless of what other players 
were doing, s would be a dominant strategy (Owen, 1968:25).  Neither Offense nor 
Defense has a dominant strategy.  If both had dominant pure strategies, their intersection 
would be the classic saddle point (von Neumann, 1944:95). 
If no players have a dominant solution, they must select the ‘best’ strategy based 
on what they know (and what they think all the other players know).  However, if one 
player always chooses the same pure strategy or chooses pure strategies in a fixed order, 
  Defense 
  Run Pass Blitz 
Run -3 5 5 
Short Pass 3 0 3 
Medium Pass 7 0 6 Offense 
Long Pass 10 0 -10 
In yards gained by Offense 
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opponents in time will recognize the pattern and exploit the information to defeat the 
player.  Thus, when no dominant pure strategy exists, the most effective strategy is a 
mixed strategy (Owen, 1968:16).  A mixed strategy is defined by a probability 
distribution over the set of pure strategies.  Under a mixed strategy, each player will form 
a probabilistic assessment over what other players will do.  Thus, when a player chooses 
one of their own strategies, they are choosing a lottery over other player’s mixed strategy 
profiles.  Further, a player can interpret other player’s mixed strategies as expectations of 
how they are likely to play (Luce, 1957:74). 
The notation presented thus far can be extended as follows: A mixed strategy σi is 
a probability distribution over the pure strategies and σ is the space of mixed strategy 
profiles.  σi (si) is the probability that σi assigns to si where ∑
i
σi (si) = 1 and  σi (si) ≥ 0.  
Additionally, ui(σi) = player i’s outcome under the mixed strategy (Fudenberg, 1993:5). 
Assumed in Game Theory is that players will select the strategy that maximizes 
their outcome given the other players’ strategies.  If every player is playing their best 
strategy, there is no incentive for any player to unilaterally change their strategy and thus, 
the players are at strategic equilibrium or Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg, 1993:11).  An 
important result for mixed strategies is every finite game has at least one strategic 
equilibrium, which was proved by John Nash in his dissertation, Non-cooperative games 
(1950).  This equilibrium, or optimum set of strategies, can be found using the Minimax 
Theorem.  The key result of this theorem is when one player attempts to minimize their 
opponent’s maximum outcome, while their opponent attempts the contrary; the result is 
the minimum of the maximum outcomes equals the maximum of the minimum outcomes 
(von Neumann, 1944:93). 
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A solution is a description of an outcome that may emerge from a game.  The 
optimal solution guaranteed by the Minimax Theorem can be solved via linear 
programming for 2-player, constant-sum games in a program of the form shown in Figure 
25, which yields the optimal strategy for the column player.  The row player strategy can 
be found via the dual solution (Winston, 1994:840). 
 
Figure 25.  Program for Column Player's Strategy 
The Gridiron game resulted in the following mixed strategies for Offense (0.50, 0, 
0.31, 0.19) and for Defense (0.31, 0.63, 0.06).  Thus, Game Theory is ‘conditionally 
normative’ and suggests how each side ought to play to achieve certain ends (Luce, 
1957:63).  Here, Offense should Run 50% of the time, never play the Short Pass, play 
Medium Pass 31% of the time, and go Long 19% of the time.  The Defensive strategies 
can be interpreted in a similar manner.  Additionally, the value of the game, z, is 2.5.  By 
convention, the row player maximizes and the column player minimizes.  Thus, the game 
value suggests Offense is expected to gain 2.5 yards, on average, on each play of 
Gridiron. 
The Gridiron game demonstrated a zero-sum game solution.  For non-constant 
sum games, solutions in pure strategies can be found via the algorithm in Figure 26.  
However, not all non-constant sum games have solutions in pure strategies.  Although 
every game has at least one equilibrium point in mixed strategies, finding these points for 
maximize: z = -yn+1 
subject to: u11y1 + u12y2 +…+ u1nyn - yn+1 ≤ 0 
  u21y1 + u22y2 +…+ u2nyn - yn+1 ≤ 0 
  ····················································· 
  um1y1 + um2y2 +…+ umnyn - yn+1 ≤ 0 
                 y1 + y2 +…+ yn = 1 
                   y1, y2,…, yn > 0 
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non-constant sum games requires more complex solution techniques such as the reverse 




Figure 26.  Non-constant Sum Pure Strategy Solution Algorithm 
(Kaplan, 1982:154) 
The aim of the above review was to illustrate the benefits and uses of Game 
Theory.  Specifically, Game Theory is a mathematically robust approach to thinking 
strategically in conflict situations involving other decision-making entities with 
conflicting objectives. 
For player I with outcome matrix A and player II with outcome matrix B: 
 
1.  In each column of A, underline the largest value in the column. 
2.  In each row of B, underline the largest value in each row. 
3.  Positions ij in A and B in which both aij and bij were underlined are 
equilibrium points in pure strategies. 
 
Example: 
0  0  8
2  1  0
7 2 0
0  5 1
6 0  0
















THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
APPENDIX B: RATIO NORMALIZATION 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate a normalization technique which 
makes dissimilar measures commensurate for the purposes of aggregation, while 
preserving the original ratio level meaning of the individual measurements.  The example 
concerns a notional system with five, context relevant attributes and their associated 
measures.  In line with the algorithm in Figure 11, it is assumed a desired end-state has 
been specified and equal interval measurement scales have been developed for the five 
system attributes.  System measurements are taken at five points in time.  The desired 
system attribute assignments, as well as the equal interval transformations for each of the 
five system attributes are shown in Table 15.  Further, Table 16 shows the distance from 
the desired end-state value for each attribute.  Using the values in Table 16 as inputs to 
the equation in step 5 of Figure 11, the normalization constants (kj) for each system 
attribute, at each time step (j) are shown in Table 17. 
As seen in Table 17, the normalization ‘constants’ are changing at each time step 
with each new system observation.  Because the constants are changing from one time 
step to another, normalized values for the current system state are not comparable to 
normalized values of previous system states based on different constants.  In order to 
compare the current state to previous system states, all previous attribute values must be 
normalized using the calculated constants from the most recent system observation.  For 
the five observations in this illustration, the result is shown in Table 18.  While the values 
shown in Observation4 of Table 18 are normalized within each attribute dimension, the 
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attributes are not yet normalized with respect to each other.  This is achieved by scaling 
the values in each attribute dimension relative to a common system observation.  For this 
illustration, Observation0 is used as the common reference and the results are shown in 
Table 19.  Additionally, Table 19 shows the aggregated attribute observations (assuming 
equal weighting among the attributes) using the Power metric for r = 1 (rectilinear) and r 
= 2 (straight-line). 
Table 15.  Observed System Attribute Assignments 
System Attribute: A B C D E
XDESIRED 10 2 100 15 0.5
Time0 2 100 80 25 10
Time1 4 75 85 20 5
Time2 6 50 92 15 1
Time3 8 10 96 10 0.7
Time4 9 5 98 12 0.2  
Table 16.  Attribute Distance from Desired 
System Attribute: A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 8 98 20 10 9.5
Time1 6 73 15 5 4.5
Time2 4 48 8 0 0.5
Time3 2 8 4 5 0.2
Time4 1 3 2 3 0.3  
Table 17.  System Attribute Normalization Constants 
System Attribute: A B C D E
XDESIRED 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time0 0.125 0.010 0.050 0.100 0.105
Time1 0.071 0.006 0.029 0.067 0.071
Time2 0.056 0.005 0.023 0.067 0.069
Time3 0.050 0.004 0.021 0.050 0.068




Table 18.  Normalized Values for each System Observation 
Observation0 A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 1 1 1 1 1
Observation1 A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.67 0.68
Time1 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.32
Observation2 A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.67 0.66
Time1 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.31
Time2 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.03
Observation3 A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.65
Time1 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.31
Time2 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.03
Time3 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.01
Observation4 A B C D E
XDESIRED 0 0 0 0 0
Time0 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.63
Time1 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.22 0.30
Time2 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.00 0.03
Time3 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.01
Time4 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.02  
Table 19.  Normalized State Values 
System Attribute: A B C D E r = 1 r = 2
Time0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Time1 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.50 0.47 0.64 0.66
Time2 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.29 0.36
Time3 0.25 0.08 0.20 0.50 0.02 0.21 0.27
Time4 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.15  
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APPENDIX C: KALMAN FILTERING 
 
The following example is designed to illustrate the detailed mechanics involved in 
implementing a Kalman filter.  The notional system of interest, X, will have two 
attributes, A and B.  No model is available for X and the underlying behavior and 
relationships between A and B are unknown.  A 2nd order Kalman filter will be used to 
estimate the state of the system based on observations, or measurements, of the system’s 
two attributes. 
It is assumed numerous measurements will be taken, thus, process noise can be 
set to zero.  Additionally, it is assumed there is no a priori information on how to 
initialize the filter.  These two assumptions greatly simplify the filter state estimate 
calculations.  The matrix form of a second-order Kalman filter for a single system 
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−−− −−− kskskk xTxTxx &&& , is the residual between the most current 
measurement and a projection of the preceding estimate to the current time (Zarchan, 




−−− −−− kskskk xTxTxx &&&  produces 






























 ( 16 ) 
Additionally, the above two assumptions allow the gains, K, to be calculated via the 































 ( 17 ) 
The above equations, (16) and (17), were implemented in a Microsoft® EXCEL® 
spreadsheet and used on the notional system attribute measurements with Ts = 1 as shown 
in Table 20. 
Table 20.  Notional Data and Results 
Time Measurement #
Period k K1k K2k K3k A B A B xk x_dotk x_wdotk xk x_dotk x_wdotk
0 1 1.0000 3.0000 10.0000 10.0000 1000.0000 10.0000 1000.0000 10.0000 30.0000 100.0000 1000.0000 3000.0000 10000.0000
1 2 1.0000 2.2500 2.5000 10.0972 927.7364 -79.9028 -8072.2636 10.0972 -49.7813 -99.7570 927.7364 -5162.5930 -10180.6589
2 3 1.0000 1.5000 1.0000 10.9337 907.6948 100.4963 10232.8808 10.9337 1.2061 0.7393 907.6948 6.0693 52.2219
3 4 0.9500 1.0500 0.5000 11.3544 833.2678 -1.1551 -106.6071 11.4122 0.7326 0.1618 838.5982 -53.6463 -1.0817
4 5 0.8857 0.7714 0.2857 11.7389 750.5178 -0.4867 -33.8932 11.7946 0.5189 0.0227 754.3913 -80.8742 -10.7654
5 6 0.8214 0.5893 0.1786 11.8059 733.1754 -0.5189 65.0409 11.8986 0.2358 -0.0700 721.5609 -53.3119 0.8490
6 7 0.7619 0.4643 0.1190 12.2847 690.6145 0.1853 21.9410 12.2406 0.2519 -0.0479 685.3905 -42.2760 3.4610
7 8 0.7083 0.3750 0.0833 12.4315 669.7430 -0.0370 24.8980 12.4423 0.1901 -0.0510 662.4811 -29.4782 5.5359
8 9 0.6606 0.3091 0.0606 13.6162 650.3141 1.0093 14.5433 13.2737 0.4511 0.0102 645.3782 -19.4471 6.4173
9 10 0.6182 0.2591 0.0455 14.1758 635.6134 0.4460 6.4738 14.0055 0.5768 0.0305 633.1416 -11.3526 6.7115
10 11 0.5804 0.2203 0.0350 14.7179 616.8418 0.1203 -8.3031 14.6674 0.6338 0.0347 620.3256 -6.4700 6.4212
11 12 0.5467 0.1896 0.0275 15.7338 575.7121 0.4153 -41.3541 15.5455 0.7472 0.0461 594.4578 -7.8879 5.2851
12 13 0.5165 0.1648 0.0220 16.4561 539.0188 0.1403 -50.1937 16.3882 0.8164 0.0492 563.2882 -10.8764 4.1820
13 14 0.4893 0.1446 0.0179 17.1267 502.1468 -0.1024 -52.3559 17.1790 0.8507 0.0473 528.8858 -14.2674 3.2470
14 15 0.4647 0.1279 0.0147 18.2221 485.6167 0.1687 -30.6252 18.1318 0.9196 0.0498 502.0102 -14.9386 2.7967
15 16 0.4424 0.1140 0.0123 18.8789 476.9400 -0.1974 -11.5299 18.9889 0.9469 0.0474 483.3691 -13.4560 2.6554
16 17 0.4221 0.1022 0.0103 19.5474 431.2822 -0.4121 -39.9587 19.7856 0.9522 0.0431 454.3749 -14.8831 2.2430
17 18 0.4035 0.0921 0.0088 21.3488 390.6959 0.5894 -49.9174 20.9972 1.0496 0.0483 420.4712 -17.2377 1.8051
18 19 0.3865 0.0835 0.0075 22.6429 376.6328 0.5719 -27.5032 22.2920 1.1456 0.0526 393.5070 -17.7280 1.5983
19 20 0.3708 0.0760 0.0065 23.2938 366.2288 -0.1701 -10.3494 23.4009 1.1853 0.0515 372.7409 -16.9159 1.5311
20 21 0.3563 0.0695 0.0056 24.5539 360.5393 -0.0580 3.9488 24.5913 1.2328 0.0512 357.9975 -15.1105 1.5534
21 22 0.3429 0.0637 0.0049 24.9328 327.2480 -0.9168 -16.4157 25.5353 1.2255 0.0466 338.0350 -14.6033 1.4723
22 23 0.3304 0.0587 0.0043 26.8109 304.6944 0.0268 -19.4734 26.7930 1.2738 0.0468 317.7331 -14.2740 1.3877
23 24 0.3188 0.0542 0.0038 29.1431 282.1684 1.0529 -21.9845 28.4258 1.3776 0.0508 297.1433 -14.0786 1.3031
24 25 0.3080 0.0503 0.0034 32.0189 258.3226 2.1900 -25.3936 30.5035 1.5385 0.0583 275.8941 -14.0517 1.2163
25 26 0.2979 0.0467 0.0031 33.8027 235.7770 1.7316 -26.6735 32.5870 1.6776 0.0636 254.5039 -14.0811 1.1349




26 27 0.2885 0.0435 0.0027 35.5963 220.3984 1.2999 -20.5918 34.6714 1.7978 0.0671 235.0505 -13.8423 1.0785
27 28 0.2796 0.0406 0.0025 37.2554 198.8763 0.7526 -22.8712 36.7131 1.8955 0.0690 215.3537 -13.6933 1.0222
28 29 0.2712 0.0380 0.0022 38.9933 188.5023 0.3501 -13.6692 38.7381 1.9778 0.0698 198.4646 -13.1911 0.9918
29 30 0.2633 0.0357 0.0020 41.1540 185.9133 0.4032 0.1439 40.8570 2.0620 0.0706 185.8073 -12.1942 0.9921
30 31 0.2559 0.0335 0.0018 39.1087 192.3844 -3.8455 18.2753 41.9703 2.0036 0.0635 178.7851 -10.5891 1.0256
31 32 0.2488 0.0316 0.0017 39.0853 192.5722 -4.9204 23.8635 42.7813 1.9117 0.0553 174.6467 -8.8099 1.0654
32 33 0.2422 0.0298 0.0015 38.7025 201.7955 -6.0182 35.4260 43.2633 1.7877 0.0461 174.9486 -6.6890 1.1196
33 34 0.2359 0.0282 0.0014 37.7542 209.9635 -7.3199 41.1440 43.3477 1.6278 0.0359 178.5234 -4.4111 1.1772
34 35 0.2299 0.0266 0.0013 37.6724 216.1331 -7.3210 41.4322 43.3106 1.4686 0.0264 184.2244 -2.1302 1.2305
35 36 0.2242 0.0252 0.0012 37.4115 225.0739 -7.3809 42.3644 43.1379 1.3087 0.0177 192.2058 0.1700 1.2807
36 37 0.2187 0.0240 0.0011 36.9120 231.7934 -7.5434 38.7772 42.8055 1.1456 0.0094 201.4981 2.3800 1.3232
37 38 0.2136 0.0228 0.0010 35.7966 234.3232 -8.1592 29.7836 42.2133 0.9693 0.0012 210.9003 4.3814 1.3533
38 39 0.2086 0.0217 0.0009 34.4374 245.3459 -8.7458 29.3876 41.3585 0.7809 -0.0070 222.0894 6.3715 1.3809
39 40 0.2039 0.0206 0.0009 33.8877 257.3322 -8.2482 28.1808 40.4540 0.6036 -0.0142 234.8980 8.3342 1.4054
40 41 0.1994 0.0197 0.0008 33.4984 260.3816 -7.5521 16.4467 39.5445 0.4407 -0.0203 247.2147 10.0634 1.4187
41 42 0.1951 0.0188 0.0008 31.9890 270.8083 -7.9860 12.8208 38.4169 0.2702 -0.0264 260.4889 11.7232 1.4284
42 43 0.1910 0.0180 0.0007 31.1188 278.9536 -7.5551 6.0273 37.2311 0.1081 -0.0317 274.0774 13.2600 1.4327
43 44 0.1870 0.0172 0.0007 30.4596 280.6821 -6.8637 -7.3717 36.0397 -0.0416 -0.0362 286.6751 14.5659 1.4278
44 45 0.1832 0.0165 0.0006 30.4336 284.4283 -5.5464 -17.5266 34.9637 -0.1691 -0.0396 298.7436 15.7051 1.4170
45 46 0.1796 0.0158 0.0006 30.0575 295.9551 -4.7173 -19.2022 33.9277 -0.2832 -0.0423 311.7089 16.8191 1.4059
46 47 0.1761 0.0151 0.0005 29.7373 300.7992 -3.8860 -28.4317 32.9391 -0.3844 -0.0445 324.2248 17.7944 1.3905
47 48 0.1727 0.0145 0.0005 28.3917 303.6619 -4.1408 -39.0526 31.8173 -0.4891 -0.0466 335.9699 18.6170 1.3706
48 49 0.1695 0.0140 0.0005 28.2124 311.5005 -3.0926 -43.7717 30.7809 -0.5788 -0.0481 347.8547 19.3759 1.3495
49 50 0.1663 0.0134 0.0005 27.2388 319.6022 -2.9392 -48.3032 29.6892 -0.6664 -0.0494 359.8709 20.0763 1.3277
50 51 0.1633 0.0129 0.0004 27.0393 332.4836 -1.9588 -48.1275 28.6781 -0.7411 -0.0502 372.7507 20.7815 1.3071
51 52 0.1604 0.0125 0.0004 26.5488 346.3668 -1.3631 -47.8190 27.6932 -0.8083 -0.0508 386.5148 21.4929 1.2879
52 53 0.1576 0.0120 0.0004 26.4572 362.8238 -0.4024 -45.8278 26.7961 -0.8639 -0.0509 401.4286 22.2305 1.2704
53 54 0.1549 0.0116 0.0004 26.3184 376.6544 0.4117 -47.6398 25.9705 -0.9101 -0.0508 416.9146 22.9492 1.2532
54 55 0.1523 0.0112 0.0003 25.4977 388.2686 0.4626 -52.2218 25.1055 -0.9557 -0.0506 432.5376 23.6188 1.2354
55 56 0.1498 0.0108 0.0003 24.9223 405.0131 0.7978 -51.7610 24.2439 -0.9977 -0.0504 449.0224 24.2956 1.2186
56 57 0.1473 0.0104 0.0003 24.2614 405.5084 1.0404 -68.4189 23.3743 -1.0372 -0.0500 463.8482 24.8007 1.1975
57 58 0.1449 0.0101 0.0003 23.3611 413.2443 1.0490 -76.0034 22.4641 -1.0767 -0.0497 478.2314 25.2320 1.1753
58 59 0.1427 0.0098 0.0003 23.0711 420.2371 1.7086 -83.8139 21.6063 -1.1098 -0.0493 492.0949 25.5899 1.1520
59 60 0.1404 0.0094 0.0003 22.183 430.4876 1.7106 -87.7733 20.7121 -1.1429 -0.0488 505.9350 25.9134 1.1288
60 61 0.1383 0.0091 0.0003 21.3 436.7222 1.7553 -95.6906 19.7876 -1.1756 -0.0484 519.1813 26.1675 1.1047
61 62 0.1362 0.0089 0.0002 21.013 456.7506 2.4250 -89.1505 18.9180 -1.2025 -0.0478 533.7602 26.4827 1.0833
62 63 0.1342 0.0086 0.0002 20.912 460.7689 3.2199 -100.0156 18.1236 -1.2227 -0.0470 547.3667 26.7073 1.0604
63 64 0.1322 0.0083 0.0002 20.036 465.9368 3.1585 -108.6674 17.2949 -1.2434 -0.0464 560.2395 26.8630 1.0367
64 65 0.1303 0.0081 0.0002 19.091 471.0184 3.0622 -116.6025 16.4273 -1.2650 -0.0457 572.4300 26.9577 1.0123
65 66 0.1284 0.0078 0.0002 18.874 480.7311 3.7347 -119.1628 15.6190 -1.2814 -0.0450 584.5908 27.0356 0.9886
66 67 0.1266 0.0076 0.0002 18.201 493.2815 3.8860 -118.8392 14.8071 -1.2968 -0.0442 597.0735 27.1192 0.9659
67 68 0.1249 0.0074 0.0002 18.111 496.1271 4.6226 -128.5485 14.0654 -1.3069 -0.0434 608.6247 27.1340 0.9424
68 69 0.1232 0.0072 0.0002 17.98 504.2782 5.2435 -131.9517 13.3826 -1.3125 -0.0425 619.9792 27.1275 0.9193
69 70 0.1215 0.0070 0.0002 17.818 511.3157 5.7687 -136.2507 12.7497 -1.3147 -0.0415 631.0125 27.0942 0.8965
70 71 0.1199 0.0068 0.0002 16.965 520.7042 5.5508 -137.8507 12.0797 -1.3184 -0.0406 642.0295 27.0531 0.8743
71 72 0.1183 0.0066 0.0002 16.959 540.7521 6.2184 -128.7677 11.4767 -1.3179 -0.0396 654.2859 27.0752 0.8544
72 73 0.1168 0.0064 0.0001 16.247 558.7942 6.1079 -122.9942 10.8522 -1.3182 -0.0387 667.4262 27.1374 0.8362
73 74 0.1153 0.0063 0.0001 15.491 578.9129 5.9761 -116.0688 10.2036 -1.3194 -0.0379 681.6015 27.2455 0.8197
74 75 0.1138 0.0061 0.0001 15.474 581.0453 6.6085 -128.2116 9.6174 -1.3169 -0.0370 694.6637 27.2817 0.8022
75 76 0.1124 0.0060 0.0001 15.146 601.7007 6.8640 -120.6458 9.0535 -1.3131 -0.0361 708.7858 27.3655 0.7863
76 77 0.1110 0.0058 0.0001 15.008 622.7958 7.2860 -113.7487 8.5312 -1.3069 -0.0352 723.9167 27.4916 0.7719
77 78 0.1097 0.0057 0.0001 14.757 639.5241 7.5497 -112.2702 8.0347 -1.2993 -0.0342 739.4822 27.6282 0.7583
78 79 0.1083 0.0055 0.0001 14.154 640.7331 7.4359 -126.7564 7.5240 -1.2925 -0.0334 753.7561 27.6867 0.7434
79 80 0.1071 0.0054 0.0001 13.712 657.9354 7.4976 -123.8791 7.0175 -1.2855 -0.0325 768.5523 27.7629 0.7294
80 81 0.1058 0.0053 0.0001 13.637 679.4352 7.9208 -117.2447 6.5537 -1.2764 -0.0317 784.2754 27.8760 0.7167
81 82 0.1046 0.0051 0.0001 13.348 706.1581 8.0868 -106.3516 6.1072 -1.2665 -0.0308 801.3884 28.0469 0.7055
82 83 0.1034 0.0050 0.0001 13.256 727.8767 8.4305 -101.9114 5.6967 -1.2551 -0.0300 819.2533 28.2416 0.6952
83 84 0.1022 0.0049 0.0001 12.818 738.1386 8.3914 -109.7039 5.2842 -1.2440 -0.0291 836.6310 28.3998 0.6845
84 85 0.1011 0.0048 0.0001 12.497 754.4575 8.4716 -110.9155 4.8817 -1.2326 -0.0283 854.1648 28.5537 0.6740
85 86 0.0999 0.0047 0.0001 12.042 780.5586 8.4075 -102.4969 4.4751 -1.2217 -0.0276 872.8129 28.7486 0.6647
86 87 0.0988 0.0046 0.0001 11.794 800.8892 8.5546 -101.0046 4.0851 -1.2101 -0.0268 891.9111 28.9517 0.6558
87 88 0.0978 0.0045 0.0001 11.747 809.2624 8.8856 -111.9282 3.7303 -1.1973 -0.0261 910.2484 29.1072 0.6463
88 89 0.0967 0.0044 0.0001 12.842 737.2199 10.3222 -202.4589 3.5182 -1.1782 -0.0252 920.0987 28.8686 0.6296
89 90 0.0957 0.0043 0.0001 13.038 729.5463 10.7105 -219.7357 3.3522 -1.1576 -0.0244 928.2568 28.5585 0.6121
90 91 0.0947 0.0042 0.0001 13.347 695.5929 11.1646 -261.5285 3.2395 -1.1353 -0.0235 932.3604 28.0763 0.5919
91 92 0.0937 0.0041 0.0001 14.45 630.0393 12.3579 -330.6933 3.2503 -1.1082 -0.0226 929.7489 27.3138 0.5673
92 93 0.0927 0.0040 0.0001 15.203 588.4304 13.0725 -368.9160 3.3430 -1.0783 -0.0216 923.1374 26.4018 0.5406
93 94 0.0918 0.0039 0.0001 15.749 578.244 13.4952 -371.5655 3.4925 -1.0470 -0.0207 915.7060 25.4835 0.5146
94 95 0.0909 0.0038 0.0001 16.665 559.0496 14.2296 -382.3972 3.7280 -1.0130 -0.0197 906.7032 24.5276 0.4887
95 96 0.0899 0.0038 0.0001 17.865 546.6477 15.1602 -384.8274 4.0688 -0.9756 -0.0187 896.8600 23.5665 0.4634
96 97 0.0891 0.0037 0.0001 18.766 498.1982 15.6819 -422.4600 4.4805 -0.9364 -0.0177 883.0338 22.4703 0.4364
97 98 0.0882 0.0036 0.0001 20.284 468.3824 16.7486 -437.3399 5.0122 -0.8936 -0.0167 867.1542 21.3246 0.4094
98 99 0.0873 0.0035 0.0001 22.273 430.9043 18.1628 -457.7791 5.6965 -0.8459 -0.0156 848.7044 20.1105 0.3819
99 100 0.0865 0.0035 0.0001 24.11 405.8956 19.2677 -463.1102 6.5093 -0.7945 -0.0145 828.9496 18.8822 0.3549

















Figure 27.  2nd Order Kalman Filter Estimate of a Two Attribute Notional System 
Figure 27 highlights the results of the 2nd order Kalman filter on the notional, two 
attribute system.  Although the true system state is unknown, the filter diverges from the 
measurements.  As previously noted, this occurs from use of a linear estimator on non-
linear behavior.  Also previously noted, this divergence can be addressed by increasing 
the sampling rate.  Figure 28 shows the improved filter performance using a sampling 





























































THEORY OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT 
 
APPENDIX D: IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS (BAR CHARTS) 
 
The following twenty-five figures highlight the results of the illustrative example 
presented in this research.  The data in the charts was derived via the developed 
effectiveness measurement framework (Figure 23).  The figures provide time 
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